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This paper explores how the Stability and Growth Pact may cope with the future costs of 
population ageing in the European Union. Clearly, population ageing has forced 
countries to reform their pension systems, and will continue to do so, both by reducing 
the generosity of pension arrangements and by switching to funding rather than relying 
on pure pay-as-you go pension provision. We study how such reforms affect the room for 
adhering to the Pact, but also how the Pact may induce or hamper the incentives for 
reform. In our analysis we will draw on recent literature on the Pact and on the pensions 
and the ageing problem. We will also calibrate a simple model for addressing 
intergenerational equity. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper aims at addressing the link between two major European policy issues at the 
heart of the macroeconomic debate. One issue concerns the rising ageing costs over the 
coming decades and the resulting need for pension reform to cope with these higher 
expenditures. Starting from a situation in which Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) pension 
systems dominate the scene, many politically difficult decisions still need to be taken, 
although a number of countries have put serious effort into the reform of their pension 
systems. The other issue concerns the adherence to the EU's fiscal rules. They are 
enshrined in the Treaty and detailed in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). So far, 
compliance with the Pact has been weak: public debt ratios are on average the same as 
ten years ago, while the 3% ceiling on the deficit ratio has been frequently violated. Even 
worse, these violations have taken place under circumstances that are much more 
favourable in terms of demography than those that lie ahead. 
Weak compliance with the original Pact led to its reform in 2005 that accentuated the 
object of long-term sustainability. Yet, a number of key questions should be posed. If it 
has already been difficult to adhere to the Pact when ageing costs are on average still 
relatively moderate, how will compliance with the (revised) Pact be affected when the 
expected dramatic rise in the ageing costs really sets in? Will the Pact stimulate reforms 
of pension and health care systems in such a way that the costs can be contained? Is the 
Pact indeed instrumental in producing long-term sustainability of the public finances? 
What are the consequences of the Pact for intergenerational equity, i.e. does the Pact 
provide sufficient incentive to frontload ageing costs, with the aim of easing budgetary 
pressures to be faced by the subsequent generations?  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses projections of 
the demography and age-related public spending for the EU-25. Then, in Section 3 we 
discuss the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact, both before and after its 
recent reform, including the links between the SGP and pension reforms and the issues of 
the implicit pension liabilities and intergenerational equity. While important, the latter 
two issues are not explicitly addressed in the SGP. Those issues take the centre stage in 
Section 4, where we set up a model to provide numerical illustrations of public debts, 
deficits and implicit liabilities under different pension and fiscal arrangements, while 
paying explicit attention to a transition towards (partial) funding that might be required 
for intergenerational equity. We link the outcomes explicitly to the restrictions imposed 3 
by the SGP. Further implications of this analysis will be discussed in Section 5, while 
Section 6 concludes the main body of the paper. The Appendix will present the formal 
model in full while in the main text the references to it are kept minimal. 
 
2. Projections of demography and ageing costs 
For a comprehensive view of the future budgetary pressures, we present in Table 1 
figures for demographic variables, future public pensions and other age-related public 
expenditures in 2004 and 2050 based on Economic Policy Committee and European 
Commission (2006a, b), which we henceforth refer to as “EPC projections”. 
The projections provide the baseline figures, which are based on unchanged policies. 
That is, they are based on enacted legislation (that may still need to enter into force) and 
on a commonly agreed upon set of macroeconomic assumptions regarding the labour 
force, productivity growth and real interest rates. Pension projections are produced by the 
Member countries using their own, national models. Projections for the other expenditure 
items are computed by the European Commission. The projections abstract from 
potential general equilibrium effects. For example, they do not take into account the 
possible consequences of rising taxes and premium payments on the labour supply. 
While there are substantial uncertainties about the outcomes, in particular due to 
potential deviations of the demographic outcomes from their projections or private sector 
behavioural responses to the future developments, the figures should suffice to 
demonstrate the financial severity of the ageing problem. 
The old-age dependency ratios (columns 4 and 5, Table 1) are projected to increase in all 
countries, though not by the same amount. In particular, the Mediterranean countries 
(Italy, Spain, and Greece) exhibit strong increases in the share of the elderly, primarily 
due to low fertility. This is also the reason why the most recent EU entrants catch up so 
dramatically with the other countries in terms of ageing. Existing fertility rates are even 
lower for these countries than for the Mediterranean countries. Over the long run, 
fertility rates are projected to converge to some extent, although differences will remain. 
Differences in the development of pension expenditures, health care and long-term care 
are determined by differences in demographic changes, as well as differences in the 
pension and health systems themselves (in particular, the generosity of the benefits). 4 
                                                
Pension expenditures in 2004 range from 4.7% of GDP in Ireland to 14.2% in Italy. 
While the average increase in the EU-25 by 2050 is a relatively moderate 2.2%-points of 
GDP, which is relatively much less than the increase in the old-age-dependency ratio, it 
hides large differences among the Member States, from the 5.9%-points decrease in 
Poland to a 12.9%-points increase in Cyprus. 
Health-care and long-term care costs are also expected to rise on average roughly at the 
same relative speed as the pensions. However, the dispersion across countries is smaller. 
Finally, educational expenses are projected to decline, in line with the falling share of 
children in the total population. 
While very instructive, this data may still miss the full scale of the ageing problem for 
several reasons. First, judging the pension burden, one should not only consider the 
outlays on public pensions, but also the burden of the private, funded pensions. This is of 
particular importance when those private pensions have (largely) a defined-benefit 
character. If such pension funds are classified outside the public sector accounts,
4 then 
their burden on future workers is hidden from the figures shown in Table 1, but it is as 
real as the burden presented by public sector pensions. Second, the projections are only 
up to 2050. The reason why this limitation is important is that the ageing problem 
persists also in the decades following the projection period. While the generation of 
baby-boomers will largely have passed away by 2050, the old-age dependency ratio 
remains high, because fertility is projected to remain low (well below the replacement 
rate) and life expectancy can reasonably be expected to remain high and maybe rise even 
further. This matters for public policies, because under such a scenario the problem 
caused by ageing persists indefinitely, even if the old age dependency ratio stabilises at 
some (high) level. 
 
4 As is the case, for example, for the ABP, the Dutch teachers and civil servants pension fund. 5 









spend.  (%GDP) 
Health-care sp. 
(% of GDP) 
Long-term care 
sp. (% of  GDP) 
Education sp. 
(% of GDP) 
  2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 2004 2050 
BE  1.6  1.7 26.1 47.2 10.4 15.5 6.2 7.6 0.9 1.8 5.6 5.0 
DK  1.8  1.8 22.5 41.9  9.5 12.8  6.9 7.8 1.1 2.2 7.8 7.5 
DE  1.4  1.5 26.8 51.7 11.4 13.1 6.0 7.2 1.0 2.0 4.0 3.2 
EL  1.3 1.5  26.4  60.4  ..  .. 5.1 6.8  ..  .. 3.5 3.1 
ES  1.3  1.4 24.6 65.6  8.6 15.7 6.1 8.3 0.5 0.8 3.7 3.1 
FR  1.9  1.9 25.2 46.4 12.8 14.8 7.7 9.5  ..  .. 5.0 4.5 
IE  2.0  1.8 16.4 45.2  4.7 11.1 5.3 7.3 0.6 1.2 4.1 3.1 
IT  1.3  1.4 28.9 62.2 14.2 14.7 5.8 7.1 1.5 2.2 4.3 3.7 
LU  1.7  1.8 21.0 36.1 10.0 17.4 5.1 6.3 0.9 1.5 3.3 2.4 
NL  1.8  1.8 20.5 40.6  7.7 11.2 6.1 7.4 0.5 1.1 4.8 4.6 
AT  1.4  1.5 22.8 52.4 13.4 12.2 5.3 6.8 0.6 1.5 5.1 4.1 
PT  1.5  1.6 24.9 58.5 11.1 20.8 6.7 7.2  ..  .. 5.1 4.8 
FI  1.8  1.8 23.3 46.7 10.7 13.7 5.6 7.0 1.7 3.5 6.0 5.3 
SE  1.7  1.9 26.4 40.9 10.6 11.2 6.7 7.7 3.8 5.5 7.3 6.4 
UK  1.7  1.8 24.3 45.0  6.6  8.6  7.0 8.9 1.0 1.8 4.6 4.0 
CY  1.5  1.5 17.5 43.2  6.9 19.8 2.9 4.0  ..  .. 6.3 4.0 
CZ  1.2  1.5 19.7 54.8  8.5 14.0 6.4 8.4 0.3 0.7 3.8 3.1 
EE  1.4  1.6 23.8 43.1  6.7  4.2 5.4 6.5  ..  .. 5.0 3.6 
HU  1.3  1.6 22.6 48.3 10.4 16.9 5.5 6.5  ..  .. 4.5 3.8 
LT  1.3  1.6 22.3 44.9  6.7  8.6  3.7 4.6 0.5 0.9 5.0 3.3 
LV  1.3  1.6 23.6 44.1  6.8  5.6 5.1 6.2 0.4 0.7 4.9 3.5 
MT  1.7  1.6 19.0 40.6  7.4  7.0 4.2 6.1 0.9 1.1 4.4 3.3 
PL  1.2  1.6 18.6 51.0 13.9  8.0 4.1 5.5 0.1 0.2 5.0 3.1 
SK  1.2  1.6 16.3 50.6  7.2  9.0 4.4 6.3 0.7 1.3 3.7 2.4 
SI  1.2  1.5 21.4 55.6 11.0 18.3 6.4 8.0 0.9 2.2 5.3 4.9 
EU-25  1.5  1.6 24.5 51.4 10.6 12.8 6.4 7.9 0.9 1.5 4.6 4.0 
EU-15  1.5  1.6 25.6 51.6 10.6 12.9 6.4 8.1 0.9 1.5 4.6 4.0 
€  area  1.5  1.6 25.9 53.6 11.5 14.1 6.3 7.8 0.7 1.3 4.4 3.8 
 
Notes: (1) AT = Austria, BE = Belgium, CY = Cyprus, CZ = Czech Republic, DK = Denmark, DE = Germany, EE = 
Estonia, ES = Spain, EL = Greece, FI = Finland, FR = France, HU = Hungary, IE = Ireland, IT = Italy, LV = Latvia, 
LT = Lithuania, LU = Luxemburg, MT = Malta, NL = Netherlands, PL = Poland, PT = Portugal, SE = Sweden, SI = 
Slovenia, SK = Slovak Republic, UK = United Kingdom. (2) Fertility is the number of children per woman of child-
bearing age. (3) The old-age dependency ratio is the ratio of the number of 65 years and older divided by the number 
of people in the age group 15-64. (4) “..” = figure not available. 
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3. The Stability and Growth Pact 
While monetary policy in the euro area is delegated to the ECB, fiscal policy remains in 
the hands of the national authorities. They should, however, according to the Treaty 
agreed in Maastricht in 1991, comply with the principle of sound public finances. To 
ensure this the Treaty prohibits central bank financing to governments, their privileged 
access to other financial institutions and the bail-out of debts of any public entity with 
the help of the European Community or its Member States. A bail-out of a Member State 
in severe budgetary trouble by raising inflation to erode the real burden of its debt 
servicing costs was also excluded by setting price stability as the primary objective of the 
ECB. This arsenal of protection measures was still complemented by laying out an 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) with reference values for deficits (3% of GDP) and 
debt (60% of GDP). Yet, some countries believed that all this would still not be sufficient 
guarantee for the ECB to be able to operate independently and achieve price stability. 
This fear led the German Finance Minister at the time to come up with a proposal for a 
so-called Stability Pact that would lead to automatic financial punishments for countries 
with excessive deficits. However, the eventual agreement was coined the "Stability and 
Growth Pact" to reflect the view of some Member States (in particular, France) that the 
task of the EU fiscal framework was also to stimulate economic activity. Moreover, the 
automatic fines were replaced by a complex procedure of increasing severity of 
punishments that would only in the end lead to the payment of fines (see Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz, 1998, for a more detailed discussion on the SGP and its rationales). 
3.1. The original Pact 
The Pact basically makes the Treaty-based Excessive Deficit Procedure operational. It is 
part of secondary law in the EU and can be amended without changing the Treaty on the 
European Union. It is composed of two components. One arm (the Regulation “on the 
Strengthening of Surveillance of Budgetary Positions and the Surveillance and 
Coordination of Economic Policies”) aims at preventing excessive deficits by requiring 
countries to strive for a budget that is close to balance or in surplus in the medium run. 
This way, countries build up a safety margin that prevents the deficit from rising above 
its reference level of 3% of GDP when the economy is in a downturn. The safety margin 
thus allows the automatic stabilizers to do their work (see Buti et al., 1998), unless the 
economy falls into a very severe recession. As part of this Regulation, euro area 
members have to submit a “Stability Program” every year, in which they set out its 7 
budgetary path for the coming years and the measures that underpin the projected path. 
EU countries that have not (yet) adopted the euro, submit similar “Convergence 
Programs”. The programs are assessed by the Commission, which provides 
recommendations on their content, after which the ECOFIN Council gives its opinion. 
The other regulation is that on “Speeding up and Clarifying the Implementation of the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure”. This is the corrective arm of the Pact setting out the 
provisions for adhering to the Treaty based objectives that the deficit should stay below 
3% of GDP, while the public debt should remain below 60% of GDP, or be decreasing at 
a sufficient pace. In practice, only the deficit criterion is enforced through specific 
measures. If an excessive deficit is detected, the Commission and the ECOFIN Council 
put in motion the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). The EDP foresees measures of 
increasing severity the longer the country maintains its excessive deficit. The country 
may even undergo financial penalties, first in the form of a non-interest bearing deposit, 
which can be turned into a fine, if the country does not correct the deficit before the 
prescribed deadline. 
3.2. Evaluation of the Pact and comparison with reform proposals in the literature 
Motivated by the (expected) problems with the implementation of the SGP, a large 
number of experts have put forward more specific proposals to change the SGP, 
including the proposal to abolish the Pact. Fischer et al. (2006) classify the various 
proposals, though they restrict themselves to proposals made before 20 March 2005, the 
date when the European Council (2005) approved the outline for the revision of the Pact. 
Proposals are based on a variety of arguments. One major group of proposals concerns 
the lack of credibility of the original framework. Their proposals mainly aim at 
institutional and procedural changes that strengthen the incentives for fiscal discipline. A 
noticeable example is Wyplosz' (2005) proposal for independent fiscal policy councils, 
so that the ECOFIN members no longer judge each other's policies. Related proposals 
were also made in von Hagen (2002) and Fatas et al. (2003). A second group emphasizes 
that fiscal rules should shift focus to economic growth. For example, Fitoussi (2002) 
argues that fiscal rules should be contingent on the state of the economy. In particular, he 
argues in favour of replacing the current deficit rule with a debt rule, which would allow 
more flexibility in response to an economic downturn. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2004) 
advocate golden rules or capital budgeting to fix the alleged disincentive for public 
investments under the SGP. A third group of proposals focuses on long-term 8 
sustainability. Also this group is in favour of more prominence of public debt instead of 
deficits. An example is Pisani-Ferry (2002). He also advocates more emphasis on the 
medium run monitoring of comprehensive public finance figures. Calmfors and Corsetti 
(2004) propose an SGP deficit ceiling that is explicitly dependent on the public debt. 
Buiter and Grafe (2004) present the “permanent balance rule”, which allows a higher 
deficit in response to transfer payments, government consumption and gross capital 
formation that exceed their permanent (that is, roughly speaking, the average expected 
future) levels. In their view it is of particular importance that the countries that entered 
the EU after the turn of the century and where infrastructure is in a deplorable state 
implying a need for temporarily high investment in public capital, be allowed to run a 
temporarily higher deficit. More importantly, they consider that the increase in future 
PAYG public pensions causes the permanent level of pension transfers to exceed current 
pension transfers, which implies the need for reducing debt, i.e. producing smaller public 
deficits or even surpluses. 
A major virtue of the permanent balance rule is that it is aimed at keeping the tax rate 
constant (as long as no new information arrives) and that it would thereby help to reduce 
distortionary losses. A major complication, of course, is that the rule would require 
projections of budgetary variables long into the future. In addition, it is not clear how it 
should be enforced.  
Although the issue of fiscal sustainability is high on the priority list of a number of these 
proposals, somewhat surprisingly existing proposals have paid very little, if any, 
attention to the question how the SGP could be better aligned with the need to reform 
pension systems. The articles by Beetsma and Debrun (2004, 2007) are somewhat of an 
exception. They argue that a strict implementation of a deficit rule may hamper structural 
reforms if such reforms entail large upfront costs. Obviously, this is not the case for all 
types of structural reforms (such as reforms that involve a widening of the tax base at 
given tax rates). However, this is certainly the case for some types of reforms, such as a 
shift of the pension system towards more funding. Beetsma and Debrun's (2004, 2007) 
variable for upfront cost also includes compensation that needs to be provided to get the 
support from those who lose out on the reforms.  9 
                                                
3.3. The revised Pact: medium term objectives and the costs of structural reforms 
The revision of the Stability and Growth Pact was agreed at the European Council in 
March 2005, after the Pact had been put on hold at the end of 2003 as a result of the 
failure to follow its formal procedure in the case of the excessive deficits of Germany 
and France.
5 There was a general recognition that the Pact should handle the protracted 
slowdown of these economies in an adequate way and that it would make sense to have a 
Pact that would discourage pro-cyclical fiscal behaviour (by inducing countries to 
strengthen their public finances during good times in order to have more room for 
manoeuvre during bad times) and pay more attention to long-run fiscal sustainability (see 
also Buti and Nogueira Martins, 2006). 
The definition of the medium term objective (MTO) was made country-specific, taking 
account of potential growth and of the debt level, subject to possible revision when major 
structural reforms are implemented and in any case every four years. For countries that 
have already adopted the euro or participate in ERM-II, the MTO ranges from a 
minimum of -1% of GDP for low debt or high potential growth countries to budget 
balance or surplus for high debt/low potential growth countries. The MTOs are defined 
net of one-off and temporary measures. As long as a country has not yet reached its 
MTO, it should achieve an annual reduction in its cyclically adjusted deficit, again net of 
one-off and temporary measures, of at least 0.5% of GDP. The short-run costs of 
structural reforms are explicitly recognized for defining the adjustment path to the MTO, 
but in general not directly for the determination of the MTO itself.  
 
5 Apart from the fact that in many Member States deficits exceeded 3% there was a particular issue that 
triggered the crisis in implementing the SGP in 2003. It was the question as to what should happen when 
the Member States in excessive deficit have implemented the recommendations given to it, but exogenous 
factors turn out to be more unfavourable than expected and the deficit therefore does not decline. This was 
especially relevant for Germany in 2003. The Commission took the view that it was legally obliged to 
recommend moving to the next stage on the road towards sanctions while Germany, supported by France, 
wanted to go back to the previous recommendations and revise them (Korkman, 2005, p. 117). This 
dispute caused a deadlock in the Council as the required qualified majority was not found under the correct 
legal procedure to any decision. In the subsequent ruling the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities (2004) considered (among other things) that recommendations given at the earlier stage can 
indeed be modified by the Council, but this cannot happen without a fresh recommendation from the 
Commission (paragraph 92). After this clarification to the original SGP the possibility of repeating the 
steps was made explicit in the revised SGP, i.e. in the modifications to the SGP regulation in question. 10 
                                                
3.4. Pension system reform and the revised SGP 
Traditionally, only the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom have featured a 
substantial funded pension pillar, while in most EU countries pensions are largely 
unfunded.
6 If strictly applied, a pure PAYG pension system means that contributions into 
the system exactly match the pension payments. Hence, the presence of such a system 
neither affects government deficit nor public debt. However, the consequence of a pure 
PAYG system is that over the coming decades fewer workers would have to finance the 
pension benefits of an increasing number of retirees. Hence, in the absence of a reduction 
in pension benefits or an increase in the retirement age, PAYG pension premium 
payments have to increase substantially. This has two major implications. One is a 
potentially unfair distribution of the aging costs with future workers at the losing end. 
The other is that high premium payments may distort the labour supply, although the 
precise effects depend on the intra-temporal trade off between income and substitution 
effects and on the scope for inter-temporal substitution in labour supply.
7 In addition to 
the rise in the number of pensions to be paid out for each working person, also other age-
related expenditures, in particular health care and long-term care will increase. While the 
old usually do make contributions to the health care system, they receive a 
disproportionate share of its benefits. 
The projected rise in the future financial burden on workers in the absence of reform may 
easily induce governments to take economically unsound measures. Governments may 
start to finance the rising expenditures by running deficits and issuing debt, thereby 
potentially violating the rules of the SGP. Alternatively, or in combination, they may 
resort to one-off measures such as the sale of public assets or substituting explicit debt 
for off-balance liabilities. For example, in the recent past some countries (France and 
Germany) received a cash-inflow in return for an increase in future pension liabilities 
(see Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry, 2005). Empirical evidence suggests that such budgetary 
gimmickry has been widely applied – see Milesi-Ferretti and Morriyama (2004), von 
 
6 An overview of European pension systems is found in European Commission (2006a), pages 52-56. A 
scheme of the pension reforms in the EU is contained in the European Commission (2006b), pages 28-31. 
See also Whiteford and Whitehouse (2006). 
7 Disposable (after-tax) income falls. In order to (partially) make up for this reduction in consumption 
possibilities, individuals increase their labour supply. The substitution effect works in the opposite 
direction. Leisure becomes relatively cheaper in terms of the foregone net wage. This produces a negative 
effect on the incentive to work. What is the overall effect of these two forces depends on the specific 
preferences entertained by individuals. Inter-temporal substitution produces a shift in labour supply from 11 
                                                                                                                                                
Hagen and Wolff (2004) and Koen and Van den Noord (2005). However, the reformed 
SGP at least partly addresses this issue, as the main fiscal indicator is the structural 
balance net of temporary factors and one-off measures. 
In anticipation of the rising ageing costs and to more evenly share the costs of old-age 
pension provision among the generations, countries have started to introduce both 
systemic and parametric reforms in their pension systems. Italy, Latvia, Poland and 
Sweden transformed their old Defined Benefit (DB) PAYG systems to Notional Defined 
Contribution (NDC) systems where the pension contributions earn an administratively 
determined return, basically equal (or closely related) to the rate of growth of the wage 
bill and the notional capital is converted at retirement into an annuity. This rule to a great 
extent takes care of adjusting pension according to the number of employees and change 
in longevity. The latter three of these countries also set up mandatory funded tiers with 
personal accounts. Some countries have introduced personal retirement accounts, often 
supported by tax incentives (for example, Estonia, Ireland, Germany and Lithuania) or 
made mandatory to new labour market entrants or specific groups (such as Hungary, 
Slovakia and Slovenia). Also, the role of funded private supplementary occupational 
pensions is increasing. Countries are also undertaking parametric reforms to ease the 
pressure on future public resources. Among those measures, most countries are gradually 
raising the retirement age, increasing the contribution period for a full pension, linking 
pensions to improvements in life expectancy, limiting early retirement and introducing 
bonuses for working longer. Also, indexation of pension benefits has in some countries 
been shifted from wages to prices (France and Austria). Furthermore, in some countries, 
pre-funding within or linked to public DB systems remains significant (Finland) or has 
recently been introduced (Belgium and Ireland). Overall, apart from measures to increase 
the effective retirement age, pension funding is acquiring a more important role in 
pension systems, although PAYG remains dominant so far. 
Privatisation that (normally) replaces part of the public pension system by a private 
sector managed fully funded tier triggers a transition during which a stock of assets is 
built up in the newly established funded pillar, while at the same moment the pensions of 
the current retirees need to be financed.
8 To ease the transition, the government may start 
 
periods when premium payments are high (and, thus, the net wage is low) to periods when premium 
payments are low. 
8 This is the counterpart of the windfall gain that the first generation of retirees receives when a PAYG 
public pension system is installed for which they did not have to contribute during their working life. 12 
                                                
issuing debt, making some of the implicit debt explicit. However, the problem here is 
that the public deficit and debt increase, while the fall in implicit liabilities due to the 
reduction of future pension payments from the PAYG pillar is not recognised in the 
national accounts relevant for the SGP assessments. In addition, in most cases the 
emerging surplus in the new funded pillar will not be part of the government accounts as, 
according to the decision by Eurostat (2004), funded defined-contribution schemes 
should be recorded as part of the private sector.
9
The transition from the original system to a (partially) funded system outside the 
government accounts may thus lead to a potential conflict with the rules of the SGP. The 
preventive arm of the revised SGP takes this into account as follows: 
"…The Council acknowledges that special attention must be paid to pension reforms 
introducing a multi-pillar system that includes a mandatory, fully funded pillar. Although 
these reforms entail a short-term deterioration of public finances during the 
implementation period, the long-term sustainability of public finances is clearly 
improved. The Council therefore agrees that Member States implementing such reforms 
should be allowed to deviate from the adjustment path towards the MTO, or from the 
MTO itself. The deviation from the MTO should reflect the net cost of the reform to the 
publicly managed pillar, provided the deviation remains temporary and an appropriate 
safety margin to the reference value is preserved. " 
In the corrective arm the leeway provided by the revision of the SGP is specified in the 
following way: 
"…Consideration to the net cost of the reform will be given for the initial five years after 
a Member State has introduced a mandatory fully-funded system, or five years after 2004 
for Member States that have already introduced such a system. Furthermore, it will also 
be regressive, i.e. during a period of five years consideration will be given to 100, 80, 60, 
40 and 20 percent of the net cost of the reform to the publicly managed pillar." (European 
Council, 2005; also ECOFIN Council, 2005). 
We should note here that the allowed deviations from the (path to) the MTO and the 
reference deficit level as a share of the cost are falling over time and restricted to five 
years only, while transitions during pension reforms typically last for decades (for a 
detailed presentation of these rules, see European Commission, 2007). 
 
9 This decision by Eurostat concerned the defined contribution, funded pension systems that may be 
managed by the government. It considered that the fund’s assets are ultimately owned by the participants, 
who are the ones that bear the risk associated with the return on the assets. Therefore, they should be 
classified in the private sector. For the defined benefit schemes an important criterion is the degree of 
funding. The Dutch occupational defined-benefit system is classified in the private sector as it is fully 
funded while the Finnish partially mandatory defined-benefit system falls within general government as 
the degree of funding is only about a quarter.  13 
                                                
Moreover, the new SGP provisions can alleviate only a shift from PAYG towards partial 
privatisation. Other reforms, such as reductions in the generosity of future pension 
benefits and increases in retirement age are not directly facilitated for the simple reason 
that they do not lead to short-run costs.
10 However, they are indirectly facilitated by the 
new SGP through the emphasis it puts on sustainability. 
3.5. Treatment of implicit liabilities and long-term sustainability  
In revising the SGP it was recognised that implicit liabilities, notably those related to 
population ageing should be taken into account in setting the MTOs. However, the 
criteria and modalities were left open for further agreement in the Council. Current 
practice partly follows the lines of Buiter (1985): based on the projection of increasing 
expenditures the constant tax rate that covers future expenditure and the servicing of the 
current debt is calculated and this is compared to the tax rate under current policies. The 
difference between the two is called the 'sustainability gap'. Given the expenditure 
projection, it indicates the permanent budgetary adjustment that ensures that the inter-
temporal budget constraint is fulfilled over an infinite horizon.
11 The European 
Commission (2006) presents its implications as the required primary balance over a 
specified period in the medium term, adding, however, that setting budget adjustment 
targets along these lines would require a large adjustment in most countries. Therefore, it 
argues, along the lines expressed by the European Council (2005), that adjusting future 
expenditure downwards by implementing structural reforms should be part of a policy 
package for reaching sustainability. 
As part of the preventive arm of the SGP Member States are asked to address long-term 
sustainability in their Stability and Convergence Programmes. According to the ECOFIN 
 
10 While there exist a number of papers that deal with the political-economy effects of population ageing 
on pension arrangements (for example, Conesa and Krueger, 1999, and Gonzalez-Eiras and Niepelt, 2005), 
there are only a few papers that also make a formal connection with Stability and Growth Pact. A notable 
example is Tabellini (2003) who considers "a pension reform that gradually but permanently reduces 
pension outlays in the future, but immediately cuts social security contributions so as to relax political 
constraints". He notes that a "transition from a pay-as-you-go towards a fully funded private pension 
system could have this effect", and further notes that such a reform could violate the SGP, no matter how 
desirable from an economic point of view. 
11 See also Buiter and Grafe (2004). This method is also used by the Board of Trustees of the US Social 
Security system (Board of Trustees, 2007). Since 1988 they have reported the measure for an immediate 
adjustment for balance over a 75 years period. However, as this does not properly reflect the (likely) 
imbalance at the end of the period, they have from 2003 onwards reported this measure also for the infinite 
horizon. The latter is the same as the sustainability gap referred to here. 14 
Council (2005), setting up the guidelines "…the programmes should outline the 
countries’ strategies to ensure the sustainability of public finances, especially in light of 
the economic and budgetary impact of ageing population." Further, the ECOFIN Council 
(2005) says: "The programmes should include all the necessary additional information, 
both of qualitative and quantitative nature, so as to enable the Commission and the 
Council to assess the sustainability of Member States of public finances based on current 
policies…. Programmes should clearly distinguish between measures that have been 
enacted and measures that are envisaged." By reporting long-term projections under 
unchanged policies, including those determining the taxes, the submitted data 
demonstrate how the increasing ageing costs show up in rising explicit debt. 
While the corrective arm of the Pact primarily focuses on deficits and pays some 
attention to explicit debt, implicit pension liabilities are now addressed to the extent that 
the cost of switching towards a funded pension system allows for a temporary deviation 
from the 3% deficit ceiling, thereby facilitating a reduction in implicit pension liabilities. 
The international statistical community made progress in March 2007 in preparing the 
proposal for revising the treatment of pension entitlements in national accounts (see 
Advisory Expert Group on National Accounts (AEG), 2007; also European Commission, 
2007, Part II, Section 2.3). It was agreed that the pension liabilities of private 
corporations will be shown on their balance sheet, as is already the case under 
International Financing Reporting Standards (IFRS) for (listed) companies. Due to the 
difficulties in defining pension liabilities under the government social insurance schemes, 
these will not be shown in the core accounts but new supplementary accounts will be 
established for this purpose. The concept to be used will be the accrued-to-reference date 
liability. 
The pension entitlements of the government’s own employees form a special case as 
neutrality with respect to private sector employers should require recording it as 
government debt. This could add roughly 50-60% of GDP to the public debt figures in 
the European welfare states. However, pension entitlements of government employees 
may be closer to social insurance schemes and it is therefore foreseen that they would be 
shown in the supplementary accounts only. The more precise criteria where to draw the 
line will be set up later. It is admitted that there will be difficult border line cases and 
international comparisons will be hampered as fully harmonised treatment will not be 
found, simply because pension systems considerably differ from one country to another. 15 
3.6. Intergenerational equity 
While the revised SGP puts more emphasis on fiscal sustainability, it is important to 
realize that there are many potential sustainable fiscal paths with very different 
distributive and efficiency implications across generations. In fact, while under rather 
weak conditions on macroeconomic developments perfect adherence to the SGP would 
guarantee fiscal solvency, such a policy would only by coincidence ensure an optimal 
intergenerational distribution of the costs of population ageing (however this may be 
defined). It would also only by coincidence ensure efficiency through the minimization 
of the present discounted sum of the losses caused by the distortionary taxes and 
premium payments needed to finance the (ageing-related) public expenditures. Hence, 
even if the Pact is never violated, the intergenerational distribution of the ageing costs 
may be very unequal. For example, if governments choose to address the ageing costs by 
raising revenues only when increased expenditure materializes, then the current workers, 
especially the older ones, will benefit at the expense of the younger generations, who will 
have to bear the increasing financial burden. This burden would be shared more 
equitably if also benefits are reduced, the effective retirement age is raised and/or the 
increase in pension contributions is frontloaded. 
Establishing the intergenerational distribution of the costs and benefits from pension and 
other age-dependent arrangements is a difficult matter, let alone what might be a “fair” 
distribution. A number of factors would reasonably need to be taken into account. First, 
how long is a cohort expected to receive pension benefits and medical treatment? If 
future cohorts are expected to live longer and they do not face a corresponding increase 
in their retirement age then it seems reasonable that they also face a higher contribution 
rate. Also, one might need to take account of differences in fertility. A generation that 
produces fewer children per adult should pay more for given benefits or receive less 
generous pensions (Sinn 2000). Account must also be taken of public investments that 
have been made or are being made by current workers and from which the future workers 
will also profit. A proper intergenerational contract would require future workers to make 
similar public investments or else make larger contributions into the pension system. 
Given these complex issues, it is not surprising that the Pact does not address the issues 
of efficiency and intergenerational distribution. These do not directly affect the 
functioning of the common monetary policy, while distributional issues are a matter of 
political preferences expressed and implemented at the national level – affecting the 16 
fundamental principles of national social security is even explicitly excluded from the 
competence of the European Union (EU Treaty article 137). The problem is that young 
(those below the eligible voting age) and unborn generations are not naturally 
represented in the political processes. Hence, they have no vote in decisions affecting the 
future explicit and implicit debt burden, but they are still affected by these decisions. 
Indeed, given that those who have to shoulder part of burden cannot decide about its 
distribution, one can easily imagine a political-economy equilibrium in which the 
decision about a pension reform (for example, a reduction in benefits or a lengthening of 
working life) is postponed longer than would be socially optimal, thereby leading a 
country into a major crisis. This should show that incapacity to cope with 
intergenerational distribution related to the major public expenditure schemes could 
grossly breach the principle of sound public finances established in the EU Treaty. It has 
also certainly been addressed under the SGP, and to an increasing extent under its 
revision, as reduction of public debt has been called for to prepare for the future 
expenditure pressures. However, it is clear, as also admitted by the European 
Commission (2006, p. 21-22), that the SGP does not incorporate intergenerational equity 
explicitly and systematically. This is what we want to tackle below with the help of a 
simple model and numerical illustrations. 
 
4. The intergenerational distribution of costs under alternative fiscal rules 
Here we address explicitly the consequences, under population ageing, of different fiscal 
and pension arrangements for public deficits, public debt, implicit liabilities and the 
balance of contributions and benefits per cohort. The former two variables are of 
particular importance for assessing to what extent the arrangements comply with the 
SGP. The balance of contributions and benefits per cohort is the key for assessing the 
size of potential economic distortions and the intergenerational distribution of the ageing 
burden. We illustrate the consequences of a fall in fertility and a rise in life expectancy. 
An important question that we try to address is whether compliance with the SGP can be 
consistent with a balanced treatment of successive generations that we shall term 
actuarial neutrality. 
4.1 Description of the pension model The model that underlies the illustration is presented in the Appendix. It is adapted from 
Oksanen (2005 and 2006). Here, we just describe its main features. For convenience, we 
use a partial equilibrium “overlapping-generations” model of total wage cost, pension 
contributions and public pensions. There are three generations: children, workers and 
retirees. Workers (or employers on their behalf) contribute to the pension system, while 
the retirees receive a public pension (and do not pay pension contributions or, for 
simplicity, other taxes). The pensions can be partly (or fully) financed out of current 
workers' contributions and they can be partly (or fully) financed out of the pension 
systems assets (which are consolidated with the assets – or debt – of the rest of the 
government). The extreme case in which current pensions are completely financed out of 
current workers’ contributions is, of course, the pure PAYG system. The other extreme 
in which they are fully financed out of the system’s assets corresponds to a fully funded 
system. The discounted pension benefits to be received by the current workers are termed 
the "implicit pension debt" (IPD – this corresponds to 'accrued-to-reference date liability' 
in a more general setting) of the public sector. 
The consolidated public sector (government plus the pension system) owns (net) 
financial assets At in period t (public debt amounts to negative assets). Further, all taxes 
are levied on the wage bill.
12 The consolidated public sector budget constraint is 
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1 (1)   11 (1 ) ttt t t t tt t t cwL A wR A A ρ π −− − + −= + − , 
where ct is the tax rate, wt is the (gross) wage rate,
13 Lt is the “effective” labour supply of 
workers in period t, ρt is the financial market interest rate factor (the interest rate is ρt-1), 
πt-1 is the pension accrual rate and Rt is the “effective” number of elderly. Here,   
where   is the number of new entrants to the labour force in period t, and l
, tt t Ll L = %
t L % t is the 
number of years spent in work in period t, divided by the number of years in work in 
period 0. Further, since periods refer to generations here, and as the number of years 
during which a pension benefit is received generally differs from the number of years 
that individuals pay contributions into the pension system, we define σt as the number of 
years spent in retirement in period t divided by the number of years spent working in 
                                                 
12 For convenience, we label all primary revenues of the public sector as “taxes” even though in our 
theoretical model they consist mostly of pension contributions. The reason is that primary revenues also 
include the taxes collected (from wages) to service the initial explicit debt of the government. 
13 Here, and in the sequel, “wage” stands for “gross wage”, that is, the wage before pension contributions 
are paid. 18 









+=  is the 
wage bill growth factor and μt>0 is an exogenous mark-up of the financial market 
interest factor on the wage bill growth factor. Hence, μt is not influenced by the 
demographic shocks that we consider below.
14 The accrual rate as a share of the wage 
net of contributions,  1
n
t π − , is set by policy. Based on  1
n
t π − , one then derives the 
appropriate accrual rate πt-1 as a share of the gross wage wt (for the details on the 
calculation, see the Appendix). Dividing by the total wage bill in period t, we can also 
rewrite (1) as: 
(2)   ct = πt-1 (lt-1/lt)(σt/ft-1) + at – (1+μt) at-1, 
where ft-1 is the fertility rate (hence,   = f t L %
t-1 1 t L − % ) and at = At/(wtLt) are (net) assets as a 
share of the wage bill. 
Pure PAYG and constant debt ratio 
The first rule (PAYG), which maintains the financial position of the public sector (i.e. 
assets as a share of the total wage bill are kept constant at a level a ), implies the 
following tax rate (see the Appendix): 
(3)   = π
pcd
t c t-1 (lt-1/lt)(σt/ft-1) – μt a , 
where superscript “pcd” is used to indicate “PAYG with constant debt". Since assets are 
held constant at their initial level, we have  0 aa = , where a0 are the initial assets as a 
share of GDP. Hence, the total tax rate consists of a component that covers the pension 
outlays (the first term) and, hence, keeps the asset position of the pension system at zero, 
and a component that captures the debt-servicing cost, when public debt as a share of 
GDP (or the wage bill) is kept constant (the second term). In the case of positive public 
debt (a <0) this says that each generation has to pay the interest mark-up (above the 
growth of the wage bill) on the public debt. As for the budget balance, with positive 
                                                 
14 Note that for setting up the accounting framework, the expression for the interest rate is merely an 
identity; however, for the main results below we need to assume that μt is exogenous. wage growth, it is in surplus (deficit) if government net assets are positive (negative) (see 
the Appendix).
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Actuarial neutrality across generations 
Next, we introduce the policy rule such that in each period, given any demographic 
shock or change in any policy parameter, the tax rate is set at a constant level that is 
financially sustainable as long as there is no new shock. If and when a new shock arrives, 
the same principle is applied. The implied tax rate is found as (see the Appendix): 
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where a superscript t indicates that the variable is based on the shock in period t. For 
example, 
t
t μ  denotes the interest mark-up in period t based on all information available 
in period t, while  1
t
t μ +  denotes the expected interest mark-up in period t+1 based on all 
information available in period t. We define θ as the implicit pension debt (IPD) as a 
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Hence, θt-1 is corrected for the possible change in the retirement age in period t (for a 
detailed explanation, see the Appendix). Using these expressions, we can reduce (4) to: 
                                                 
15 One could also look at many other alternative rules. One is that a given explicit debt/GDP ratio is 
generated at some future point in time. The main problem with such a rule is that there are many different 
ways in which the future target debt/GDP ratio can be achieved. Suppose, for simplicity, that the future 
target ratio for, say, 2050 equals the current debt/GDP ratio and that society faces a problem of rising 
ageing costs. One extreme way to reach the target debt ratio is to leave pension benefits unchanged and 
raise the pension contribution rate (it could jump to a higher level now and then stay constant, or it could 
gradually rise, etc.). Another extreme path would leave contribution rates at their current levels and reduce 
the pension replacement rate. Again, the reduction could be once and for all after which no further 
reduction follows, or the replacement rate could gradually fall (but at the end to a lower level than under an 
abrupt reduction). All these paths may imply very different distributions of the ageing costs. Under a once 
and for all increase in the contribution rate, it is the current workers that start to contribute more, leaving 
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The rule here is termed "actuarial neutrality" as each generation of workers, first, 
contributes to share the burden stemming from the past decisions on pensions and other 
expenditures and revenues by paying the interest mark-up on the sum of the implicit 
pension liabilities and the explicit public debt, and, secondly, pays the full present value 
of its own future pensions. 
Further, under this rule the sum of explicit public debt (-a) and implicit liabilities as a 
share of the wage bill, labelled the “total debt ratio”, evolves as follows: 



















This equation thus implies that the total debt ratio remains constant as long as  1
tt
tt μ μ + = . 
In the more general case in which 
t
t μ  may differ from  1
t
t μ + , the total debt in the previous 
period has to be re-valued by the factor ( ) ( ) 1 1/ 1
t
t μμ + ++
t
t . If implicit liabilities increase, 
i.e.  , for example due to longer time in retirement, pension contributions 
should increase, thereby leading to an offsetting reduction in the public debt. This 
contributes a positive component to the public sector budget surplus. 
1 0
tt
tt θθ − −>
The expression for   given above is a general expression for the tax rate under actuarial 
neutrality. It is valid for any subsequent changes, permanent or temporary, in the 




t μ . Under 
this rule the balance of pension contributions and benefits of each generation is fully 
separated from the characteristics and pension policy choices of other generations 
starting from the point in time when the actuarial neutrality rule was first implemented. 
This result is quite robust as it allows, for example, any changes in 
t
t μ  as long as they do 
not depend on the other factors in the formula. To assess the plausibility of this 
assumption, note that under elementary growth theory the interest rate should depend on 
demographic factors and the pension system rules. In the model here this is the case: for 
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current retirees unaffected. With a once and for all reduction in the replacement rate, current retirees share 
in the burden of rising ageing costs. given 
t
t μ  and  1
t
t μ + , the interest rate goes down with the fall in fertility. Combined with 
the actuarial neutrality rule that affects government saving in the economy, this may be a 
plausible approximation of the functioning of the economy. 
Note furthermore that our result on the dynamics of the total debt ratio (including the 
considerations related to
t
t μ ) also covers fully funded pension systems: if the system was 
initially fully funded it remains so under the actuarial neutrality rule. The rule here is 
applicable under any initial degree of funding. The degree of funding then evolves as a 
function of factors in the formula for  . 
a
t c
4.2 The calibration 
Our numerical example is largely based on the following stylized calibration taken from 
Oksanen (2005). The unit period corresponds to 30 years, which is roughly the average 
child bearing age of women in Europe. It is also roughly the average age difference 
between a retired person (70) and a worker (40). Throughout, we assume that the annual 
growth rate of the nominal wage per worker is 3.28%, which stems from a unit real wage 
growth rate of 1.75% and an inflation rate of 1.5% per annum. The interest rate mark-up 
over the growth of the total wage bill equals 1.5 percentage points per annum. 
The economy starts in period 0 in a steady state in which the number of years at work 
equals 40 and those in retirement are 18 (hence, σt = 0.45). These numbers are thus used 
to scale pension contributions and pensions to correspond to realistic numbers, although 
the formal model works with the 30-year unit period. Also, initially, fertility preserves a 
constant population, that is, the number of children in a period equals the number of 
workers. Further, the unit pension is initially set at 55% of the wage after pension 
contributions (i.e.,  1
n
t π −  = 0.55), so as to make the initial numbers comparable with those 
for 2004 in the EPC projections. 
In period 1, there is both a 20% fall in fertility (roughly corresponding to a fall from 2.1 
children per woman, which is needed to preserve the population, to 1.7 children per 
woman, which is close to the current average fertility in Europe) and an increase in 
longevity by three years (this corresponds to one year for each 10 year period). In period 
2 there is a further increase in longevity by three years. This way we match quite closely 
the assumptions on the increase in longevity in the EPC projections for the EU average 
21 (an increase in life expectancy (at birth) for males of 6.3 years and for females of 5.1 
years between 2004 and 2050). 
4.3 The numerical results 
We show the time paths of the most relevant variables under pure PAYG and various 
policies under actuarial neutrality. We consider two possible policy measures to deal 
with the rising ageing burden: an increase in the retirement age and a reduction of the 
replacement rate; the tax rate is then determined by these factors and the type of policy 
rule implemented. For the case of actuarial neutrality we also consider a (partial) 
privatisation of the public pension pillar, where the latter is partly replaced by a 
mandatory, funded private pillar. Most numbers are expressed in percentages of GDP, 
assuming that the total wage bill (including pension contributions) is 60% of GDP. 
Table 2 displays the time paths of the tax rate and pension expenditures, the public debt, 
the implicit pension debt (IPD), the total debt and the budget surplus (all as shares of 
GDP) under the PAYG rule. A negative value for the budget surplus/GDP ratio thus 
indicates a public deficit. Throughout, the debt and the budget surplus are expressed as 
ratios of annual GDP. The Appendix describes a procedure to transform thirty-year 
figures for these variables into annual figures. In the baseline case no policy changes are 
undertaken, while in the next case the retirement age increases “moderately” so that the 
working life in period 1 rises to 41 years and in period 2 to 42 years (i.e. it rises by one-
third of the increase in life expectancy); under the “large” retirement increase the 
respectively numbers are 41.5 and 43 years (i.e. the retirement age increases by half of 
the increase in life expectancy). Further, we also consider a reduction in the pension 
accrual rate  1
n
t π −  as a share of the wage net of pension contributions from 55% to 48%. In 
Table 3 we report the corresponding cases under actuarial neutrality. In Tables 4 and 5 
we also illustrate a partial or full privatisation of the public pension system under 
actuarial neutrality. A new steady state is always achieved in period 3; the period 4 
numbers are merely reported to confirm this. Budget balances and public debt levels that 
violate the Stability and Growth pact are indicated with bold characters. 
Panel 1 of Table 2 shows the results for the baseline PAYG scenario. The reduction in 
fertility and the two-step rise in longevity produce an increase in pension expenditure 
from an initial level of 11.9% of GDP to a new steady state level of 17.5% of GDP. 
Taxes, the bulk of which consist of pension contributions, as a share of the total wage 
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cost (“wage” for short) rise from 21.7% in the beginning to 31.1% in the new steady 
state. This substantial increase in the tax rate is caused by the failure to take additional 
measures to contain the ageing costs. Given that the generosity of the pension benefits is 
untouched, the implicit pension debt rises as a share of GDP. The rise is produced both 
by the rise in the pension benefit as a share of the gross wage (due to the additional years 
in retirement) and the fall in fertility. Permanently lower fertility means that the relative 
IPD increases because the growth of the wage bill is permanently reduced, implying that 
a given amount of future pension outlays is discounted at the lower rate. Naturally, an 
increase in the retirement age alleviates the rise in pension expenditures and the tax rate. 
In period 1 the tax rate falls because the contribution period has increased while the rise 
in longevity has not yet materialized (because it concerns those working in period 1 and 
thus the longevity rise materializes in period 2). Panels 2-3 of Table 2 show the results 
for moderate and large increases in working life, respectively. Panels 4 – 6 correspond to 
panels 1 – 3, respectively, assuming that the target net replacement rate set in period 1 
and onwards is 48% instead of 55%. Obviously, as next period’s pension outlays fall, the 
implicit pension debt is lower under the lower net replacement rate. The budget surplus is 
practically unaffected in all these cases. Projected pension expenditure in Panel 5 
roughly corresponds to the EPC projection for EU-15. 
Table 3 illustrates actuarial neutrality as an alternative policy rule. The baseline assumes 
no change in the generosity of the benefits or in the retirement age. Both pension 
expenditures as a share of GDP and the tax rate rise in line with the fall in fertility and 
the rise in life expectancy. However, now the system moves to partial funding. This is 
achieved by increasing the contributions already in period 1. The rise in the implicit debt 
ratio induces an equivalent reduction in the public debt ratio (or increase in the public 
asset ratio), which naturally happens only when the deficit ratio is reduced. Actually, the 
public budget turns into a surplus from period 1 and onwards in panels 1-3. The surplus 
is largest in period 1 when the demography is hit by two shocks simultaneously (the rise 
in workers’ life expectancy and the fall in the fertility rate). An increase in the retirement 
age (panels 2 and 3) reduces the pensions (as a share of the gross wage), thereby 
lowering the implicit pension debt. This implies that fewer public assets need to be 
accumulated and, hence, the public sector runs a smaller surplus than under the baseline. 
Also, a reduction in the accrual rate (panel 4) produces a smaller implicit debt/GDP ratio, 
thereby requiring smaller surpluses than under the baseline. This effect is further 24 
strengthened when the reduction in the accrual rate is combined with the increase in the 
retirement age (panels 5 and 6). 
Panel 5 in Table 3 roughly corresponds to the EPC projection for the EU. The 
expenditure increase is 2.7%-points of GDP (that is a little higher than in the 
corresponding pure PAYG scenario because now the 48% net accrual rate leads to 
somewhat higher pensions made possible by the fall in the tax rate owing to the virtual 
elimination of the 60% of GDP public debt). 
All actuarially neutral scenarios spell out clearly that as long as the demographic change 
is permanent, the outcome should also be a permanent change in government financial 
position. Therefore, a strategy in which public assets are depleted when the ageing 
process has reached its peak is excluded, unless pension accrual is drastically reduced. 
Table 4 considers the latter option induced by a partial privatisation (possibly in 
combination with other measures) in which implicit pension debt is swapped for 
(explicit) public debt. The partial privatisation is implemented with a one-third reduction 
in the accrual rate expressed as a share of the gross wage rate. Obviously, compared to 
the baseline under actuarial neutrality, the partial privatisation leads to a reduction in 
public pension expenditure as a share of GDP and a lower tax rate as a share of the gross 
wage. Comparing period 0 with the new steady state, the debt/GDP ratio falls only 
slightly (panel 1), because the original reduction in this ratio is almost entirely offset by 
the worsening of the debt/GDP ratio caused by the partial privatisation. We observe that 
the public debt ratio in period 1 exceeds the 60% limit of the SGP, while the deficit ratio 
in that period remains just marginally below the 3% limit. Obviously, because a rise in 
the retirement age lowers the implicit debt ratio, the combination of such a rise with a 
partial privatisation produces higher public debt and deficit ratios than a partial 
privatisation alone as a larger share of implicit debt becomes explicit. The deficit ratio 
now violates the SGP in period 1 (see panels 2 and 3) and so does the debt ratio from 
period 1 onwards. Adding to this a reduction in the accrual rate leads to a further swap of 
debt, hence to a worsening of the budgetary figures (see panels 4-6). 25 
Table 2: Public finances and pensions under PAYG 
Period  0 1 2 3 4  change 
 
1. PAYG – baseline: net accrual rate 55%, fixed retirement age 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  15.9  17.5  17.5  5.6 
tax  rate  21.7 21.7 28.4 31.1 31.1  9.4 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  0.0 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5 305.4 336.3 336.3 336.3  107.8 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  365.4  396.3  396.3  396.3  107.8 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -1.9  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.4 
 
2. PAYG – net accrual rate 55%, moderate increase in working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.7  14.8  15.9  15.9  4.0 
tax  rate  21.7 21.3 26.5 28.4 28.4  6.7 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  0.0 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5 284.0 304.9 304.9 304.9  76.4 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  344.0  364.9  364.9  364.9  76.4 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -2.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.4 
 
3. PAYG – net accrual rate 55%, large increase in working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  14.3  15.1  15.1  3.2 
tax  rate  21.7 21.1 25.6 27.0 27.0  5.3 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  0.0 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5 273.7 289.5 289.5 289.5  61.0 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  333.7  349.5  349.5  349.5  61.0 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -2.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.4 
 
4. PAYG – target net replacement rate 48%; fixed retirement age 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  14.4  15.9  15.9  4.0 
tax  rate  21.7 21.7 25.8 28.3 28.3  6.6 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  0.0 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5 275.9 304.8 304.8 304.8  76.3 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  335.9  364.8  364.8  364.8  76.3 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -1.9  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.4 
 
5. PAYG – target net replacement rate 48%; moderate increase in working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.7  13.3  14.3  14.3  2.4 
tax  rate  21.7 21.3 24.1 25.8 25.8  4.1 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  0.0 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5 255.9 275.4 275.4 275.4  46.9 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  315.9  335.4  335.4  335.4  46.9 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -2.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.4 
 
6. PAYG – target net replacement rate 48%; large increase in working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  12.8  13.6  13.6  1.7 
tax  rate  21.7 21.1 23.3 24.5 24.5  2.8 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  60.0  0.0 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5 246.3 261.0 261.0 261.0  32.5 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  306.3  321.0  321.0  321.0  32.5 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -2.0  -1.5  -1.5  -1.5  0.4 
 
Notes: (1) The tax rate consists mainly of pension contributions and is expressed as % of the total wage 
cost. (2) The final column “change” gives the percentage point change from period 0 to the new steady 
state, except for the budget surplus/GDP ratio, where it gives the percentage point change from period 0 to 
the peak. 26 
 
Table 3: Public finances and pensions under actuarial neutrality 
Period  0  1 2 3 4  change 
1. Actuarial neutrality – baseline: net accrual rate 55%, fixed retirement age 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  16.3  18.2  18.2  6.3 
tax  rate  21.7  26.4 28.4 28.4 28.4  6.7 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  -25.1  -60.5 -60.5 -60.5  -120.5 
IPD/GDP,  %  228.5  313.5 349.0 349.0 349.0  120.5 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  0.0 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  2.5  2.3  1.5  1.5  4.4 
2. Actuarial neutrality – net accrual rate 55%, increase in working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  15.0  16.4  16.4  4.5 
tax  rate  21.7  25.3 26.1 26.1 26.1  4.4 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  -12.9  -38.4  -38.4  -38.4  -98.4 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  295.8  314.3  314.3  314.3  85.8 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  282.9  275.9  275.9  275.9  -12.6 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  1.8  1.5  0.9  0.9  3.7 
3. Actuarial neutrality – net accrual rate 55%, increase in working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.5  14.4  15.5  15.5  3.6 
tax  rate  21.7  24.7 25.0 25.0 25.0  3.3 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  -6.8  -27.2  -27.2  -27.2  -87.2 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  287.1  297.4  297.4  297.4  68.9 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  280.2  270.2  270.2  270.2  -18.3 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  1.5  1.1  0.7  0.7  3.4 
4. Actuarial neutrality – accrual rate reduced to 48%, fixed retirement age 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  14.6  16.3  16.3  4.4 
tax  rate  21.7  24.6 26.4 26.4 26.4  4.7 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  8.1  -24.4  -24.4  -24.4  -84.4 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  280.3  312.9  312.9  312.9  84.4 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  0.0 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  0.8  1.3  0.6  0.6  3.2 
5. Actuarial neutrality – accrual rate reduced to 48% plus increased working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  13.4  14.6  14.6  2.7 
tax  rate  21.7  23.5 24.3 24.3 24.3  2.6 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  18.8  -4.3  -4.3  -4.3  -64.3 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  264.1  280.9  280.9  280.9  52.4 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  282.9  276.6  276.6  276.6  -11.9 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  0.2  0.6  0.1  0.1  2.5 
6. Actuarial neutrality – accrual rate reduced to 48% plus increased working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.5  12.9  13.8  13.8  1.9 
tax  rate  21.7  23.0 23.2 23.2 23.2  1.5 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  24.1  5.9  5.9  5.9  -54.1 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  256.1  265.4  265.4  265.4  36.9 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  280.2  271.3  271.3  271.3  -17.2 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -0.1  0.2  -0.1  -0.1  2.1 
 
Notes: see Table 2. 27 
 
  Table 4: Public finances and pensions under actuarial neutrality: one-third privatisation 
Period  0 1 2 3 4  change 
1. Actuarial neutrality – 55% accrual rate  
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  10.9  12.1  12.1  0.2 
tax  rate  21.7 20.6 21.9 21.9 21.9  0.2 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  79.4  55.8 55.8 55.8  -4.2 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  209.0  232.7  232.7  232.7  4.2 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  0.0 
Budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -2.9  -0.8  -1.4  -1.4  -1.0 
2. Actuarial neutrality – 55% accrual rate + increase in working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  10.0  10.9  10.9  -1.0 
tax  rate  21.7 19.8 20.3 20.3 20.3  -1.4 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  85.7  68.7  68.7  68.7  8.7 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  197.2  209.5  209.5  209.5  -19.0 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  282.9  278.2  278.2  278.2  -10.3 
Budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -3.3  -1.4 -1.7 -1.7  -1.4 
3. Actuarial neutrality – 55% accrual rate + increase in working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.5  9.6  10.3  10.3  -1.6 
tax  rate  21.7 19.4 19.6 19.6 19.6  -2.1 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  88.8  75.3  75.3  75.3  15.3 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  191.4  198.2  198.2  198.2  -30.3 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  280.2  273.5  273.5  273.5  -12.0 
Budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -3.5  -1.6 -1.8 -1.8  -1.6 
4. Actuarial neutrality – accrual rate reduced to 48%  
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  9.7  10.9  10.9  -1.0 
tax  rate  21.7 19.4 20.6 20.6 20.6  -1.1 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  101.6  79.9  79.9  79.9  19.9 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  186.9  208.6  208.6  208.6  -19.9 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  288.5  288.5 288.5 288.5  0.0 
Budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -4.0  -1.5 -2.0 -2.0  -2.1 
5. Actuarial neutrality – accrual rate reduced to 48%  
+ increase in working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  9.0  9.8  9.8  -2.1 
tax  rate  21.7 18.6 19.1 19.1 19.1  -2.6 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  106.8  91.4  91.4  91.4  31.4 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  176.1  187.3  187.3  187.3  -41.2 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  282.9  278.7  278.7  278.7  -9.8 
Budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -4.4  -2.0 -2.2 -2.2  -2.5 
6. Actuarial neutrality – accrual rate reduced to 48%  
+ increase in working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.5  8.6  9.2  9.2  -2.7 
tax  rate  21.7 18.3 18.4 18.4 18.4  -3.3 
public debt/GDP, %   60.0  109.5  97.3  97.3  97.3  37.3 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  170.7  176.9  176.9  176.9  -51.6 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  280.2  274.3  274.3  274.3  -14.2 
Budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -4.5  -2.2 -2.4 -2.4  -2.6 
 
Notes: (1) The tax rate consists mainly of pension contributions and is expressed as % of the total wage 
cost. (2) The final column “change” gives the percentage point change from period 0 to the new steady 
state, except for the budget surplus/GDP ratio, where it gives the percentage point change from period 0 to 
the lowest level. 
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Table 5: Public finances and pensions under actuarial neutrality: full privatisation 
Period  0 1 2 3 4  change 
1. Actuarial neutrality – fixed retirement age 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.9  0.0  0.0  0.0  -11.9 
tax  rate  21.7 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0  -12.7 
Public debt/GDP, %   60.0  288.5  288.5  288.5  288.5  228.5 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  0  0  0  0  -228.5 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  288.5  288.5 288.5 288.5  0.0 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -13.6  -7.1 -7.1 -7.1  -11.7 
 
2. Actuarial neutrality – moderate increase in working life (40-41-42) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.6  0.0  0.0  0.0  -11.9 
tax  rate  21.7 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8  -12.9 
Public debt/GDP, %   60.0  282.9  282.9  282.9  282.9  222.9 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -228.5 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  282.9  282.9  282.9  282.9  -2.6 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -13.5 -7.2 -6.9 -6.9  -11.6 
 
3. Actuarial neutrality – large increase in working life (40-41.5-43) 
pension exp/GDP, %  11.9  11.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  -11.9 
tax  rate  21.7 8.8 8.8 8.8 8.8  -12.9 
Public debt/GDP, %   60.0  280.2  280.2  280.2  280.2  220.2 
IPD/GDP, %   228.5  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  -228.5 
total debt/GDP, %  288.5  280.2  280.2  280.2  280.2  -8.3 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  -13.4  -7.2 -6.9 -6.9  -11.5 
 
Notes: see Table 4. 
 
The final exercise we report in Table 5 is a complete privatisation under actuarial 
neutrality. The accrual rate is set at zero in period 1, i.e. no public pension will be paid 
from period 2 onwards. As pension commitments for period 1 are honoured, implicit debt 
becomes fully explicit, resulting in a public debt ratio of almost 290% of GDP, a deficit 
of over 13% in period 1 and a new steady state deficit ratio of more than 7%. The deficit 
in the new steady state is so high because the economy is growing and the debt is 
magnified as the explicit debt now includes the previous implicit debt. Although the 
transition only implies a shift of pensions from the public to private domain (under the 
underlying simplifying assumptions), both numbers imply a gross violation of the SGP. 
4.4 Other age-related expenditure 
Above, we have focused on pensions and their financing from the point of view of 
intergenerational distribution, using actuarial neutrality as the benchmark. This approach 
can be extended to cover other age-related expenditures as well. Here, we discuss the 
principles and refer to an application to the euro area or EU-15 average numbers taken 
from the EPC projections. 29 
While a projection for unemployment benefits and education expenses might be 
interesting for some purposes one should consider carefully whether these expenditures 
indeed belong to an analysis of debt and deficit focused on the distribution of the ageing 
burden between successive generations. Unemployment benefits as a percentage of GDP 
might be projected to fall in the long run, but should that enter already the determination 
of the current tax rate? It might well be more appropriate that the (projected) declining 
burden of those expenditures be reflected in the tax rate only when (if) they occur. 
One may also doubt whether a decline in education expenditure should enter the 
determination of the debt and deficit paths. If it does, the result could be that current 
workers are allowed to pay lower taxes thanks to a future decline in education 
expenditure. This may not be fair, in particular if the (projected) decline is due to a 
decline in the number of children, which after all would lead to an increase in the pension 
burden. The alternative is to view education expenditures as something to be primarily 
paid by the workers as parents as they occur (helped also by the retirees as grandparents 
with their contribution to taxes). This would imply that also education expenditure 
should be kept out of our analysis of the implications of aging for debt and deficit. 
Naturally, these arguments to leave out these two expenditure items are helpful because 
their projections are highly uncertain. 
Next come health care and long-term care expenditures. In 2004 these expenditures are 
respectively 6.4% and 0.9% of GDP in the EU-15, while their projected increase by 2050 
amounts to 1.6% and 0.7% of GDP respectively. These numbers serve here as references, 
although it should be noted that they are highly uncertain and that the conclusions 
derived from them are admittedly only tentative, requiring a substantial amount of further 
work (e.g. Chapters 4-5 in Economic Policy Committee and the European Commission, 
2006a). 
The key questions are who benefits from these expenditures and who provides the 
financing. A stylized fact is that roughly half of health care expenditure benefits the 
working age population (including their children), while the other half benefits the 
elderly, especially those approaching their final year in life. As the main bulk of public 
expenditure on long-term care is related to the elderly population, we simply assume that 
they consume all of it. 30 
Then, we have to make an estimate of the effect of a longevity increase on the use of 
health and long-term care services by the elderly. One extreme assumption is that they 
proportionally increase with the number of people over, say, 60 years of age. Another 
extreme assumption is that a longevity increase does not raise these expenditures as the 
bulk of them are concentrated on a constant number of years before death. 
Finally, it is important to note here that public health and long-term care expenditure is 
normally covered from tax revenues paid also by the elderly population. Thus, the 
financing of these expenditures differs significantly from that of the pension outlays, 
which are typically covered by pension contributions paid by workers, but not by 
pensioners. 
Fortunately, our framework above is derived from a more general model that is 
applicable also to these expenditure items. One assumption that we need to make 
concerns the ratio between the level of taxable income of the elderly to that of the 
workers. We set this at 60% having primarily in mind the level of pensions in Europe. 
This is a simple way to take into account that the elderly pay their taxes out of pensions 
that are lower than the wages of the workers. The Appendix provides the details of the 
calculations. 
Table 6 reports the results for three scenarios. In all of them, without loss of generality, 
the system is initially, until period 0, in steady state, while health and long-term care 
spending for the elderly are financed out of current taxes. Moreover, the initial public 
debt is set to zero to focus on the issue at hand. 
The effects of ageing on expenditures, taxes on wages and income of the elderly, debt 
and deficit are spelled out. We do not present the results for the financing of these 
expenditures from current taxes (analogous to pure PAYG pensions), as taxes would 
simply follow expenditures (note, however, that the net implicit debt figures in Table 6 
would also apply regardless of the financing rule). Instead, the results below are based on 
the same rule as for pensions: after any change the tax rate is set at a level that is 
financially sustainable as long as there is no new shock, and mutatis mutandis, revised 
when such a shock arrives. Our framework also computes the implicit debt for each 
period defined as the capital value of these expenditures benefiting the elderly in the 
following period. We should note that in this case the policy rule does not result in 
perfect actuarial neutrality as for pensions. This stems from the assumptions that also the 31 
elderly pay taxes and that the same tax rate is applied to both workers' and pensioners' 
incomes. For example, if those in working age start to consume a higher amount of 
health care services than the previous generation (either when still young and working or 
later when old and having retired), they should pay more and the tax rate should be 
immediately increased. However, the elderly in the same period will also pay higher 
taxes even if they would not benefit more. There is no way under the assumptions here to 
go around this interdependency that makes it impossible to implement full actuarial 
neutrality. It is important to note that the policy rule implemented here means that the 
additional tax revenues paid by the elderly in such a situation do not only benefit the 
younger generation in the same period, but they are mostly used for the redemption of 
public debt and thereby benefit all future generations. 
We do not consider the extreme case that the time as an elderly person and therefore as a 
net user of health and long-term care public services is a constant proportion of adult life, 
i.e. that a person’s health status fully improves along with longevity increase. Note, 
however, that also in this extreme case our results would be driven by the decline in 
fertility because from period 1 onwards each generation is smaller than its predecessor. 
We also leave aside the other extreme case that the health status is assumed to deteriorate 
at a fixed age regardless of the longevity increase. 
The first scenario (panel 1 of Table 6) assumes that the time as a net user of these 
services increases by two years in both period 1 and 2 while longevity is assumed to 
increase by three years. This is perhaps also a relatively optimistic assumption with 
regard to development of individuals’ health status. The result is a stepwise frontloading 
of tax collection leading to an eventual increase in government assets of 23.3% of GDP 
(or reduction of debt). Government assets rise because the tax rate immediately jumps to 
a higher level as soon as the projected expenditure increases, while this increase will 
materialise much later – in fact, in our simple model expenditure first decreases due to 
the fall in the number of children. In the second scenario the ratio of elderly to net 
contributors is assumed to increase moderately. In this case public assets increase to 27% 
in the new steady state. The third scenario additionally assumes for periods 1 and 2 a pro 
rata 4% increase in expenditures for both the younger and the elderly per the 30-year unit 
period. The implied expenditure increase of 2.3%-points of GDP roughly corresponds to 
the EPC projection for the EU average. Our rule for frontloading taxes leads in this case 
to an eventual reduction of public debt by 35% of GDP and a budget surplus of 1.4% of 32 
GDP in period 1 and 0.9% in the new steady state. Total debt decreases in these 
scenarios partly because the elderly always also contribute to the payment of 
expenditures benefiting the younger generations. 
 
Table 6: General model applied to health and long-term care expenditure 
Period  0  1 2 3 4  change 
 
1. Small increase elderly/net contributors ratio 
expenditure/GDP, %  7.3  6.9 8.1 8.5 8.5  1.2 
tax rate  10.0  10.4 10.5 10.5 10.5  0.5 
public debt/GDP, %  0.0  -18.2 -23.3 -23.3 -23.3  -23.3 
net ID/GDP, %  52.8  68.4 71.1 71.1 71.1  18.3 
total debt/GDP, %  52.8  50.2 47.9 47.9 47.9  -4.9 
budget surplus/GDP, %  0.0  0.9 0.7 0.6 0.6  0.9 
 
2. Medium increase elderly/net contributors ratio 
expenditure/GDP, %  7.3  7.0 8.4 8.9 8.9  1.6 
tax rate  10.0  10.6 10.7 10.7 10.7  0.7 
public debt/GDP, %  0.0  -20.1 -26.9 -26.9 -26.9  -26.9 
net ID/GDP, %  52.8  70.2 75.4 75.4 75.4  22.6 
total debt/GDP, %  52.8  50.1 48.5 48.5 48.5  -4.3 
budget surplus/GDP, %  0.0  1.0 0.8 0.7 0.7  1.0 
 
3. Medium increase elderly/net contributors ratio and 4% increase in expenditure per 30 years 
expenditure/GDP, %  7.3  7.3 9.1 9.6 9.6  2.3 
tax rate  10.0  11.3 11.5 11.5 11.5  1.5 
public debt/GDP, %  0.0  -27.4 -34.8 -34.8 -34.8  -34.8 
net ID/GDP, %  52.8  76.4 82.0 82.0 82.0  29.2 
total debt/GDP, %  52.8  49.0 47.2 47.2 47.2  -5.6 
budget surplus/GDP, %  0.0  1.4 1.0 0.9 0.9  1.4 
 
Notes: (1) The tax rate consists mainly of pension contributions and is expressed as % of the total wage 
cost. (2) The final column “change” gives the percentage point change from period 0 to the new steady 
state, except for the budget surplus/GDP ratio, where it gives the percentage point change from period 0 to 
the peak. 
 
Obviously, the full consequences of ageing for the public budget under the policy rule 
introduced in this paper can be calculated by summing the budgetary effects associated 
with the pension outlays and those associated with health and long-term care 
expenditures reported in Table 6. This way we can compute the (explicit) public debt, the 
total debt and the budget surplus as a share of GDP under a large number of 
combinations. Table 7  just gives one example, combining pensions under actuarial 
neutrality, a moderate retirement age increase and a net accrual rate reduction to 48% 
(case 5 in Table 3) and the last scenario for health and long-term care expenditure. The 
total debt ratio declines relatively little, showing that an unchanged ratio represents a 
rough approximation of our policy rule. The conventionally measured government deficit moves from the initial 1.9% of GDP deficit to a surplus of 1.6% for 60 years, and net 
explicit debt declines by 100% of GDP over two generations. These are large numbers 
that deserve a careful assessment. Before turning to these implications in Section 5 we 
first look into the sensitivity of our results with regard to the interest rate assumption. 
 
Table 7: Overall financial implications of ageing 
Period 0  1  2  3  4  change 
 
expenditure/GDP, %  19.2  18.9 22.5 24.3 24.3  5.1 
tax rate  31.7  34.8 35.7 35.7 35.7  4.0 
public debt/GDP, %  60.0  -8.6 -39.2 -39.2 -39.2 -99.2 
net ID/GDP, %  281.3  340.5 362.9 362.9 362.9  81.6 
total debt/GDP, %  341.3  331.9 323.8 323.8 323.8 -17.5 
budget surplus/GDP, %  -1.9  1.6 1.6 1.0 1.0 3.5 
 
Notes: (1) The tax rate consists mainly of pension contributions and is expressed as % of the total wage 
cost. (2) The final column “change” gives the percentage point change from period 0 to the new steady 
state, except for the budget surplus/GDP ratio, where it gives the percentage point change from period 0 to 
the peak. 
 
4.5 Sensitivity to the interest rate 
The above results depend on the assumed, exogenously determined interest rate margin, 
μt, of 1.5% per annum. For example, the required budget surplus in period 1 in Table 7 is 
1.6%. Still assuming μt to be exogenous and constant, this number would become 0.3% 
for μt = 3%, and nearly 4% for μt = 0, which is at the border of the dynamic efficiency of 
the economy. These numbers show that the budget surplus is rather sensitive to the 
assumed interest rate margin, which should therefore be carefully considered in all 
applications. Note, however, that this sensitivity equally concerns the permanent balance 
rule and sustainability gap indicators. 
As we argued earlier (in Section 4.1), the assumption that the interest rate falls along 
with the fall in the number of workers due to the fall in fertility is plausible. It is 
plausible even for a small open economy as population ageing takes place all over the 
world. However, without going into too much detail here, we briefly explore the 
implications of the alternative assumption that the interest rate itself, rather than its 
margin over the growth rate of the wage bill, is exogenous at a constant level  ρ . Solving 
33 our model under this alternative assumption, the expressions for the tax rate and total 
debt dynamics become respectively (see the Appendix, Section 4): 
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Note in particular that fertility in period t does not affect the IPD in period t, as the given 
pension expenditure in period t+1 is now discounted at an exogenously determined 
interest rate. However, our policy rule feeds it into the determination of the tax rate and 
thereby into the debt dynamics. 
Assuming the same value for the constant interest rate as in the initial steady state in the 
simulations reported above, the numerical results are remarkably similar for the tax rate, 
public debt and the deficit. The IPD and the total debt are affected because, compared 
with our earlier results, the interest rate margin now increases to a permanently higher 
level due to the fall in the growth of the wage bill. 
 
5. Implications of actuarial neutrality for pension reforms and the SGP 
34 
The framework presented and applied above is quite general as it is merely an accounting 
framework based on the budget identity of the public pension system. It can be used for 
discussing the implications of changes in demographic factors and policy rules. 
Combinations of these changes represent alternative public pension reforms with 
differing implications for public finances at large. Although the underlying assumptions 
are simple, the results for actuarial neutrality are quite robust. The model focuses on the 35 
demographic and pension system variables while the interest rate margin above the rate 
of growth of the economy (and of the wage rate) is exogenous, though not necessarily 
constant as we for simplicity assumed in the numerical illustrations above. Yet, 
admittedly, the applications of the framework represent a partial analysis because the 
behavioural responses of private sector agents (in particular, their labour supply 
decisions) are unambiguously left outside the present paper. In spite of this, it is apparent 
that the demographic and pension system variables dominate the results even if the 
model would comprise some endogenous private sector reactions. Hence, a number of 
interesting results for policy design can be derived. 
5.1 Implications for designing pension reforms 
The key purpose of the framework is to highlight the implicit pension debt based on the 
distinction between pension rights accrued to reference date and those to be accrued in 
future. In the examples the former was taken as given, i.e. accrued rights were assumed 
to be well defined and respected. This does not correspond to reality as different 
interested parties naturally tend to give their own interpretation to the rules and their 
implications, based on both genuine differences in understanding them and tactical 
considerations. Yet, the framework here invites for an effort to clarify the application of 
the rules up to now and arrive at, at least, a range of estimates for the accrued rights. If 
this is not done, there is a danger that the elderly, having already accrued most of their 
pension rights, fear that they will lose under any not-so-well-defined reform plan. As 
their number is increasing, this may block reforms even relating to the future 
accumulation of rights. 
The framework here can be compared to the generational accounts developed by 
Kotlikoff and others (e.g. Kotlikoff, 2002) that aim at revealing intergenerational 
imbalances by projecting public expenditure by generation under prevailing policies and 
calculating the required net tax payments for the current population and for all future 
generations. The framework in the present paper can be seen as making this approach 
operational, notably for public pensions, and developing the actuarial neutrality formula 
for spelling out the many different combinations of demographic and economic factors 
and policy rule options that treat successive generations neutrally. 
The present framework also helps to solve a puzzle in the literature on the political 
economy of pensions: it is well understood since Samuelson (1958) that a pure PAYG 36 
public pension system as an implicit intergenerational contract is superior to a fully 
funded pension system if the rate of increase in the wage bill exceeds the interest rate 
(ignoring operating costs and other complications). However, if the interest rate is 
higher, every narrowly self-interested worker would like to leave the system, place 
her/his pension savings on the market and receive a higher return on his pension 
contributions. As the latter is true in a dynamically efficient economy, it becomes 
difficult to explain the permanence of a public unfunded pension system under the simple 
assumption of self-interested individuals taking a majority vote on a mandatory PAYG 
pension system (assuming that the workers still outnumber the pensioners). Razin et al. 
(2002) go around this by assuming that the cash grant is paid to both workers and 
retirees. This artificial assumption is crucial for their results (for a critical discussion, see 
European Journal of Political Economy, 2007). Galasso (2006), following Browning 
(1975), assumes that when they vote on pensions people face a situation in which they 
lose all their accumulated rights if they do not accept to continue the current system, 
while if they do accept to continue this system, they will benefit from both the previously 
accumulated rights and those to be acquired in the future. If the question put to vote is 
formulated this way, the return on future contribution payments obviously exceeds the 
market return for workers above a certain cut-off age. However, a choice between such 
extreme alternatives hardly ever arises in real political processes, not only because most 
people would consider it brutally unfair, but also because it would tend to make reforms 
increasingly difficult. 
The actuarial neutrality rule offers an alternative framework for setting up the political 
process for pension reform, as it builds upon the distinction of accrued rights and those to 
be accrued in future: if an agreement is reached on accrued rights, then current 
pensioners and older workers should be able to lift their concerns and accept even radical 
reforms of the rules for future rights and their financing. This would allow the choice of 
the new rules from a wide range of options. The selected alternative would then 
gradually replace the original arrangement. Thus, pension reforms can be important even 
if the government does not default on its implicit debt. Surely, in this case current and 
future generations will in one form or another pay a tax for servicing the implicit debt at 
the time of the reform. 
The presentation of actuarially neutral combinations for the future can proceed in stages: 
the first stage could be to calculate the pension contribution rate required if the rules for 37 
                                                
benefits and the retirement age are maintained. For the typical European welfare state 
this leads to quite a significant immediate increase in the contribution rate. This should 
be used to reveal the true price of the prevailing pension rights, and it can be combined 
with the observation that if the increase in contribution rates is delayed, future 
generations would have to pay even higher contributions for the same benefits. Having 
made this point clearly, one could then consider reducing the benefit rights to be 
acquired from now onwards, including the replacement rate and the age for retirement. 
Thus, the trade-off between contributions and benefits from now onwards is made clear 
for each generation, and made a subject for political choice (possibly raising, as has been 
recently done in some countries, the accrual rates in the later years of a working life to 
make the retirement decision neutral in present value terms, and allowing individuals free 
to decide when to retire).
16
The actuarial neutrality rule developed above is simple because it is based on a model 
where successive generations follow each other after each 30-year unit period, i.e. all 
members of a given generation are born at the same instant. The reality is different and 
we can only interpret the results representing neutrality for an average-aged worker and 
an average-aged retiree. As the same tax rate is set for all workers in a given year, and as 
the demographic change is gradual, there is no way to reach perfect actuarial neutrality 
for every yearly age-cohort. However, our results can be generalised for annual data and 
gradual demographic change, and the unavoidable deviations from perfect neutrality 
could be estimated. 
Another easy extension of our model and numerical illustrations is to address the 
consequences of forecasting errors. Recall first that under actuarial neutrality the 
decisions for each generation are fully separated from those for the subsequent 
generations. Thus, the required time span is a generation, i.e. on average 30 years, and 
uncertainty concerning more distant future does not matter. This already helps, as people 
 
16 The rule of actuarial neutrality can also be compared with Musgrave’s (1986) ‘fixed relative position’ 
rule for determining a fair pension formula, referred to in recent discussion, e.g. by Esping-Andersen et al. 
(2002). It means that pensions are indexed to the wage rate after pension contributions, while a pure 
PAYG system is strictly preserved. Although the same indexation rule is applied in the illustrations above, 
the decisive difference is that the degree of funding is made endogenous here. The Musgrave rule deviates 
from actuarial neutrality and leads under population ageing to an increasing burden for future generations. 
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are often (rightly) worried about the accuracy of very long term projections.
17 Yet, 
projections over the next 30 years may turn out having been wrong. For example, 
suppose that the actual longevity increase for the next period turns out having been 
underestimated, something that has happened frequently in reality. Under PAYG, the tax 
rate of the workers in period 2 will go up to cover the larger amount of pension outlays. 
Explicit debt will remain constant and, hence, the consequences of the mistake are borne 
in the period in which it materializes. Under actuarial neutrality, the mistake will also 
result in a change of the tax rate. However, the increase in the tax rate in period 2 is 
limited, implying that the mistake also shows up in an increase in the total public debt. 
Thus, the consequences of the mistake are spread out over all working generations as of 
period 2. This feature is a clear advantage of an actuarial neutrality system: the system 
implicitly allows for intergenerational risk sharing by spreading the costs of unexpected 
shocks over all current and future workers. 
Furthermore, the results for actuarial neutrality developed above can be used to find for a 
given contribution rate and the various other factors the accrual rate and thereby the 
replacement rate in the next period. We do not present this extension here in detail but 
note the main, relatively straightforward implications. The emerging rule can be 
compared to Notional Defined Contribution (NDC) systems where basically the rate of 
growth of the wage bill, among other factors, determines the pensions. This blueprint of 
the NDC system deviates from actuarial neutrality to the extent that the retirement age of 
the subsequent generation affects the growth rate of the wage bill that , in turn, affects 
the replacement rate for the currently retired. Hence, complete neutrality is not achieved. 
However, we should not see this as a major deficiency of the NDC system, but recognise 
that this system goes a long way towards actuarial neutrality when compared with 
maintaining defined benefits (DB) under a pure PAYG system in the presence of an 
ageing population (for a more detailed analysis of the NDC system, notably of the 
transition from DB to NDC and the need for an additional adjustment mechanism to 
complement the basic blueprint, see Oksanen, 2004, pp. 584-586). 
 
17 Projections over 2 to 3 generations are useful to illustrate the very long-term implications of alternative 
assumptions on ageing and pensions. The uncertainty surrounding those projections is controlled by 
updating them every 5 to 10 years. 39 
5.2 Implications for the Stability and Growth Pact 
As noted above, the European Commission exploits the age-related public expenditure 
projections for analysing the long-term sustainability of the public finances, most 
recently in European Commission (2006 and 2007). Based on these projections, a 
constant tax rate as a percentage of GDP required to cover these expenditures in terms of 
present values is calculated. The difference between this tax rate and the cyclically 
adjusted current tax rate is called the sustainability gap. It gives the immediate once and 
for all adjustment that guarantees sustainability for given expenditure projection. 
In the context of the revision of the SGP in 2005 and its implementation it was well 
understood, and rightly so, that the sustainability gap indicator should not be interpreted 
as directly implying an MTO, i.e. as a recommendation to increase taxes (or the primary 
balance) to close the gap. Sustainability was given more emphasis, but it was rightly 
stressed that it would be equally important to take measures to reduce future expenditures 
so as to narrow the gap from that end. In addition, even for cases in which the 
expenditure projection would have reflected an acceptable policy line, closing the gap 
would have implied an MTO that would require a too ambitious policy revision. There 
was no readiness for this, partly because it was not yet possible to establish and agree on 
the criteria and modalities to appropriately take into account the implicit liabilities. For 
these reasons, for the time being, the medium term objectives for budgetary adjustment 
were set in the range from –1% of GDP to balance or surplus, with a more ambitious 
target for high debt and low potential growth countries and vice versa (ECOFIN Council, 
2005). Making the MTO dependent on debt presumably reflects the aim to reduce the 
disparities in indebtedness because all countries borrow from a common pool of savings, 
while high debt countries have shown less discipline in the past. Explicit debt is also 
more objectively measurable than implicit debt. While putting emphasis on explicit debt 
obviously does not primarily stem from considerations about intergenerational equity, 
potential growth could in principle be linked to intergenerational aspects, for example 
when pensions are indexed to prices and, therefore, decline relative to wages if real 
growth is higher. However, this factor could already be incorporated in the expenditure 
projection and should not be counted twice. 
The newly established MTOs to be implemented in the next few years do quite safely 
guarantee sustainability of the (explicit) public debt: they imply a reduction in public 
debt and there is no doubt that rolling over such borrowing would not encounter any 40 
difficulties in the markets. However, there is a big underlying question: can the 
governments implement those MTOs in future when ageing related expenditures 
increase, calling for increasing taxes (or reduction in some other expenditure items). The 
sustainability gap indicators help in emphasising this key question about sustainability 
by providing a summary statistic that contains the projected increase in expenditures, and 
potentially providing arguments for more rapid reduction of debt than implied by the 
current MTOs to ease the financial burden further into future. 
Also the ECOFIN Council (2006) noted that reaching the MTOs in the 2005 programmes 
based on the revised SGP guidelines would be an important step, but not sufficient. In 
particular, it called “for further structural reforms and/or budgetary consolidation, in line 
with the three-pronged strategy to ensure sustainability decided by the Stockholm 
European Council in 2001, i.e. (i) reducing debt at a fast pace; (ii) raising employment 
rates and productivity; and, (iii) reviewing and, where appropriate, reforming pension, 
health care and long-term care systems.” It also called for further work and 
improvements in methodology in the new round of expenditure projections and the 
Sustainability Report to be made available in 2009. Actuarial neutrality, focusing on 
intergenerational equity, provides further rationale and precision for the ambitious policy 
line expressed by the ECOFIN Council conclusions referred to above. 
The European Commission (2006, p. 21-22) explicitly states that so far the analysis for 
the SGP does not assess intergenerational equity. More precisely, it is not possible to do 
this systematically as the expenditure projections do not provide the data by age cohort. 
Also, with regard to the sustainability gap indicator, the technical assumption is a 
constant tax rate. Thus, the incidence of expenditure and taxes on successive generations 
that differ in terms of their demographic characteristics is not systematically taken into 
account. Therefore, in most cases for the EU countries, it tends to exaggerate the 
immediate need for budgetary adjustment to some extent (for an early comparison of the 
sustainability gap indicators and the actuarial neutrality rule, see Oksanen, 2003). 
The results from the illustrations of the (partial) privatisation of the public pension 
system clearly indicate that a conflict with the SGP rules may arise, but how serious it is 
depends on several factors. In our stylised examples for one third privatisation and 60% 41 
                                                
of GDP initial public debt (Table 4), breaching the rules becomes an apparent risk.
18 If at 
the same time there are reasons for temporarily high public investment, the conflict 
would become even more intense, while lower initial debt gives more room for 
adjustment. We should also note that our figures refer to 30-year averages. Hence, the 
peak in the yearly deficit would be even higher and it would not happen immediately (or 
over the first five years) after the privatisation but well after (as the immediate loss in 
contributions to the first pillar is followed by compounded interest on the debt this 
produces). However, note also that under a policy of frontloading the taxes to finance the 
increase in health and long-term care expenditures the budget surplus target is larger, 
thus giving more leeway to the negative effect on the budget balance of pension system 
privatisation. 
One noteworthy assumption that we made above is that the interest rate does not depend 
on swapping implicit debt (to be serviced from future taxes) for explicit debt (to be 
issued on the open market and then serviced from future taxes). Especially under a major 
privatisation this swap presumably has effects that are left outside our simple model. 
However, we should note that the direct impact of privatisation on aggregate saving is 
nil. Yet, as demand for and supply of various assets and liabilities change, secondary 
effects are likely to occur. Our stylised simple examples highlight the direct effects on 
the key fiscal variables. Even though the results can be refined, the orders of magnitude 
should not be seriously disputed. 
5.3 Measurement and treatment of implicit pension debt and the SGP 
Data on implicit pension debt, which has a prominent place in the present paper, will 
become available in the coming years. As noted above (Section 3.5) the international 
statistical community is about to finalise its proposals to set up, in the next SNA/ESA 
revision, supplementary accounts for public pension liabilities measured as the present 
value of accrued-to-reference date rights. As regards to the assessment of 
intergenerational equity, this extension to the national accounts will greatly improve the 
projections of future public expenditures as then the data will show the distinction 
 
18 Note here that the reference scenario is not a pure PAYG mono-pillar system, but a mono-pillar that is 
first reformed to implement actuarial neutrality. The latter would lead to a reduction of the public debt, 
while the one third privatisation would turn that around to an increase (compare, for example, panels 5 in 
Tables 3 and 4, respectively). 
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between future pensions resulting from rights already accrued and from rights to be 
accrued later. 
The estimates in the future supplementary accounts will then be available for improved 
analysis of the public finances. As shown in the present paper, actuarial neutrality across 
generations can be made operational as the rule of constant total debt (adequately 
modified for additional factors) and this can provide a benchmark for policy decisions. 
This would provide genuine prominence to debt sustainability in fiscal analysis and 
notably pull intergenerational equity considerations related to public pensions into the 
analysis. 
At this point it is useful to take stock of the long-standing controversy on concepts and 
practical problems surrounding implicit pension debt. Firstly, it should be recognised that 
the IPD should not be used as a stand-alone indicator of the future pension burden in all 
circumstances. This is shown in an early paper by Franco (1995) in an example in which 
the IPD does not change even though fertility falls and the next, smaller generation will, 
under a pure PAYG system, have to pay much higher contributions for the same benefits 
than their parents. His example assumes a fixed interest rate.
19 This argument is correct. 
It should, however, not discredit sensible use of the IPD for analysis and policy design. 
Equations (4’’) and (5’) in Section 4.5 above are directly applicable to the tax rate and 
debt dynamics also in this case if the straightjacket of pure PAYG is relaxed. Thus, this 
example shows again that any statistical indicator is merely an indicator, and its use for 
policy design always requires an analysis that is coherent and fits the policy issue to be 
tackled. 
Secondly, it is also often argued that its sensitivity to a change in the (perceived) interest 
rate makes the IPD a problematic variable for fiscal surveillance. However, one should 
realise that, say, a fall in accrued-to-date pension debt due to an increase in (the 
perception of) the long-term interest rate does not indicate a fall in the pension burden, 
all other things equal. We showed above that the IPD still has a prominent place in the 
analysis: the effect of the change in the interest rate on the IPD determined by past 
decisions is a capital gain or loss that should be taken into account and that appears in 
our equations for the tax rate and debt dynamics. In statistical terms this is not different 
 
19 This assumption is crucial. If the interest rate falls due to the fall in fertility together with the fall in the 
growth of the wage bill, as assumed in most of the scenarios in the present paper,  the IPD immediately 
increases. 43 
                                                
from the treatment of capital gains and losses under current national accounting rules for 
long-term fixed interest rate debt. Furthermore, private companies are required by law to 
report changes in their pension liabilities due to changes in interest rate. So, why should 
this be more difficult for the government (especially as an employer)? 
Thirdly, the IPD as defined here can be compared to open system pension liabilities, 
defined as the present values of projected pension expenditure minus revenue up to 
infinity. The correspondence between the open system liabilities and the sustainability 
gap indicator has been worked out in the most recent policy documents.
20 Thus, both of 
them are suitable for sustainability analysis, but the projection for open system liabilities, 
just like the sustainability gap indicator, is not sufficient for assessing intergenerational 
equity: it does not contain the data by age cohort and it does not make the distinction 
between rights accrued-to-reference date and those to be accrued in future (or, if they are 
in the data used, this information is suppressed by aggregation). Instead, the IPD as 
defined here, projected for the future, and based on the same assumptions as the 
projection for open system liabilities, contains the same information plus the distinction 
according to already accrued and to-be-accrued implicit liabilities. Thus, its information 
content is always larger, and most importantly, it contains the elements that are 
indispensable for a systematic treatment of intergenerational equity. Again, a coherent 
framework is needed to make use of this information. 
Furthermore, there is a completely separate controversy as to whether an effort should be 
made to estimate the (accrued-to-date) IPD, and if so, how it should be related to the 
explicit public debt. First, under most public pension systems in Europe, implicit pension 
rights are not backed by explicit contracts. Therefore, it is generally difficult to measure 
them. For example, how should one deal with the indexation of the expected future 
pension payments to inflation and or wage levels? If specific indexation rules are not 
anchored in law, but indexation is simply based on the fact that it has been a regular 
practice for a long time and/or it is based on moral arguments, can one then assume that 
the future pension payments are indexed as well? Second, it is often feared that official 
publication of implicit liabilities may give them an explicit character and thereby make it 
more difficult to reduce pension expenditure. This could be of particular concern for the 
pensions for civil servants who often have special rights. Indeed, Coeuré and Pisani-
 
20 European Commission, 2006, Chapter I and Annex I, and 2007, Section 2.3; see also Buti and Nogueira 
Martins, 2006, and Blanchet and Ouvrard, 2006. 44 
Ferry (2005) argue quite fiercely against including implicit liabilities in their measure of 
the net value of the government sector (which in their view is the right measure to look at 
when assessing fiscal sustainability, which, in turn, should be a priority of the SGP in 
their view). They state that "Implicit liabilities, such as pensions, cannot be aggregated to 
financial liabilities because they belong to a different class of debt. Governments can 
default on them without producing a financial crisis and, in fact, default is what pension 
reform frequently amounts to" and they "therefore propose to use separately the present 
value of age-related net expenditures for choosing the target for the government net 
value". 
From the concerns expressed by Coeuré and Pisani-Ferry (2005) we can derive one 
undoubtedly useful conclusion: official publication of implicit liabilities should always 
be accompanied by an explicit statement that the figures are based on current policy and 
no rights can be extracted from them. Moreover, baseline figures for implicit liabilities 
could be complemented by projections based on alternative assumptions about 
indexation, for example, to give the baseline figures a less definitive character. This 
would reflect the true nature of the IPD estimates and to a great extent take care of the 
concerns of the misuse of the officially published figures. 
In addition, we would like to emphasise that pension reforms do not necessarily mean 
that the government is defaulting on its obligations. For more complete information it is 
useful to keep the accrued-to-date IPD, which can be an object of competing 
interpretations and even default, separate from decisions with regard to future 
accumulation of rights. This distinction, as already emphasised above, is the contribution 
of the framework in the present paper and may help in opening wider options for the 
accumulation of future pension rights and their financing, after having agreed on an 
interpretation of the accrued rights. 
5.4 Does actuarial neutrality lead to overly ambitious MTOs? 
The public finance targets implied by the actuarial neutrality rule seem very ambitious in 
view of how public deficits and debt have behaved over the past 30 years in most EU 
countries. The summary example (Table 7) led to a 100 % of GDP reduction in the 
government debt ratio and a 1.6 % surplus over 60 years. First, one should ask whether 
the rationale for this policy is strong enough and, secondly, what exactly should be 
adjusted in policy and when. 45 
                                                
As to the first question, the answer could come from the principle that the rules for such 
important public policy areas as pensions and health care should be based on clearly 
expressed motivations for their existence and that their financing should, at least broadly, 
follow the principles of social insurance and thereby there should be a clear link between 
the costs and benefits for each generation. Unless future benefits are significantly 
reduced this leads to partial pre-funding in these systems. If they belong to the general 
government sector, the targets for public debt and deficit should be set such that the 
surplus in the public pension system is fully integrated with the debt and deficit targets 
imposed on the entire government sector, as otherwise the pension system surplus is 
squandered with a deficit in other public policy areas.
21 This means that even if actuarial 
neutrality were implemented in the public pension system, its effect on intergenerational 
equity requires that the target for the general government deficit is not, for example, 
fixed at zero or some other number, as this target would ultimately determine whether the 
pre-funding of pensions has the intended effect on intergenerational equity. Therefore, 
the way MTOs should be set under the SGP is of utmost importance, and it is not yet 
fully settled.  
A framework for setting the MTOs should aim at answering the question as to what 
should be adjusted and at what speed. One should first ask whether the expenditure 
projections should be taken as realistic and acceptable, at least tentatively, before 
seriously considering financing these expenditures. This might well be so for our stylised 
example summarised in Table 7. The pension expenditure projection roughly 
approximates the average for the euro area countries (that is somewhat higher than for 
the entire EU). Benefits as a share of wages are significantly reduced from current levels 
and the retirement age is set to increase. This would, under actuarial neutrality, be 
satisfied with a small surplus in the government budget. Our projection for health and 
long-term care expenditure shows a significant increase in line with the average 
EPC/AGW projections. However, there might well be a risk that current expenditure 
 
21 This means that the accumulation of funds in the public pension system should show up as a positive 
budget balance component and a reduction in net debt. If the public pension system is organised as a 
separate entity the question arises as to where should it invest. Some authors argue that if pension funds 
(private or public) invest in government bonds, they are in effect pure PAYG (e.g. Barr, 2004, p.114). This 
obviously requires that the government always issue new debt (i.e. increases the deficit) for 
accommodating such investment. In practice, this need not be the case. From the perspective of 
intergenerational equity, investment by a public (private) pension fund in government debt is neutral if the 
government net debt is reduced (kept constant) in response to this investment. Bosworth and Burtless 
(2004) find that at the state level in the US this requirement has been met, while at the national level in 46 
                                                                                                                                                
projections will be exceeded as we know that in the past couple of decades these 
expenditures have increased much faster than now projected for the coming decades 
(Economic Policy Committee and European Commission, 2006a, p. 121 and 127). 
Therefore, the extra 1.4%-points to the surplus target due to health and long-term care 
expenditures (panel 3 in Table 6) could turn out to be insufficient. In this light the current 
MTOs for the EU on average seem not ambitious enough for actuarial neutrality. 
Importantly for many countries, the projected expenditure increase considerably exceeds 
the EU average. For these countries, whatever quantitative indicator is used to express 
the imbalance, the focus should first be put on reforming the pensions and health care 
systems to contain spending growth, and move on to setting proper targets for the debt 
and deficit only on the basis of reformed rules. In some other countries the projected 
expenditure can be unrealistically low because the projections are based on a strict 
application of the rules currently in force, even though they might not be politically 
sustainable. This can result, for example, from the rule that pensions are indexed to 
prices only and therefore fall behind real wage growth (an example is Poland where the 
GDP share of pension expenditure is projected to fall by 5.9%-points). It is not easy to 
open a speculation on changes in benefit rules but it is also obvious that one should avoid 
setting the fiscal targets based on unrealistic projections. 
While one needs to treat the extreme cases separately, the ambitious budget targets 
resulting from actuarial neutrality for countries at or around the EU average numbers 
should not be too easily dismissed. The electorate could choose to go for such a level of 
benefits even if they had to pay the actuarially neutral price for them. And they could 
accept to pay that price already now that the rights are acquired, as they would 
understand that otherwise they would force the next generation to pay even higher 
pension contributions and taxes on their behalf. Technically speaking, they would then 
accept to reduce the explicit government debt in order to neutralise the effects (on 
pension contributions and taxes) of the increase in the implicit debt stemming form their 
own future benefits. 
 
OECD countries 60-100% of public pension saving has been offset by larger deficits in other budgetary 
accounts. 47 
In all events, the question about allowing time for the adjustment to actuarial neutrality is 
relevant, not only for political economy reasons (finding the necessary majority for the 
reforms) but also for purely economic grounds based on the cost of adjustment. 
Even though the unit period in the framework in this paper corresponds to 30 years, it 
can without major difficulties be applied to gradual adjustment for truly overlapping 
yearly age cohorts. The average age retiree is 30 years older than the average age worker, 
and we can use the framework for setting the parameters for these representative 
individuals. Then, if the system already implements actuarial neutrality, any changes in 
demography and possibly in pension system rules should be incorporated gradually, over 
a 30 years period. This leads to quite slow change and should not lead to adjustment 
costs that need specific treatment. However, this is in practice not the main argument for 
gradual adjustment. Instead, for most countries, as their initial conditions are far away 
from actuarial neutrality, one should ask at what pace the new policy rule should be 
implemented. 
If putting in place the new rules causes tangible adjustment costs, then it can be argued in 
the spirit of actuarial neutrality that these costs should be shared between the current and 
future generations. Thereby the new parameters of the pension arrangement should enter 
into force gradually and, as a result, total debt would, correspondingly, reach a higher 
level than with immediate adjustment. 
A completely different argument may emerge if the induced increase in government 
saving causes over-saving, or a saving glut, in the economy. This would manifest itself as 
a rate of interest below the long-term growth rate of the economy, indicating that the 
economy is dynamically inefficient and consumption could therefore be increased 
without a negative impact on consumption of future generations. It is controversial 
whether this is likely to happen in modern economies but if and when these signs would 
be seen, governments would then have the pleasant duty to increase expenditures or 
reduce taxes. One could argue that even in this case, notably because the problem with 
over-saving will most likely only be temporary, it is useful to implement actuarial 
neutrality in public pensions and move to partial pre-funding (assuming that this follows 
from the benefit rules), and use other public finance instruments to eliminate the saving 
glut. This would follow from the idea that it is useful to keep separate the transitional 
issues from the accepted principles of the pension arrangement. 48 
6. Concluding remarks 
In this paper we have explored how the Stability and Growth Pact may cope with the 
future costs of population ageing in the European Union. In anticipation of the rising 
costs associated with ageing, countries have started to or plan to reform their pension 
systems, both by reducing the generosity of pension arrangements, increasing retirement 
age and by switching from pure PAYG pension provision to pre-funding, including 
reduction of public debt and partial privatisation. We have investigated how such reforms 
relate to the provisions of the Pact. 
Although the Pact, especially after its revision in 2005, clearly aims to ease the financial 
burden to be shouldered by the future generations, it does not incorporate 
intergenerational equity explicitly. The simple model in this paper provides such a 
framework, based on the rule that generations that are identical in terms of demography 
(longevity and fertility) and retirement age should face the same tax rate for the same 
level of benefits. This implies a neatly defined benchmark termed actuarial neutrality, 
and it is shown that there exists a wide range of alternative pension arrangements that 
comply with it. The results provide further rationale and precision for the ambitious 
policy line widely expressed by the European Union finance ministers and others. They 
also show that pure PAYG rule does not, in general, comply with actuarial neutrality but 
rather tends to shift an increasing burden to future generations. 
For many countries where ageing related expenditure is projected to increase 
considerably under current policies, emphasis should be on changing those policies and 
hence on reducing the expected expenditures. The medium term objective for budget 
balance should then be set on the basis of the reformed system. However, the EPC 
projection for the EU average might be a relevant starting point for setting targets for 
debt and deficit. This average increase already incorporates a significant reduction in the 
replacement rate and an increase in retirement age, and yet, as a result of the ongoing 
change in age structure of the population, expenditures increase. Our stylised example 
above mimicking those figures and also taking into account the projected increase in 
health-care expenditure (Table 7) shows that actuarial neutrality then implies that the 
target should be a significant budget surplus for several decades. This is an ambitious 
target, and the economically optimal and politically acceptable speed to reach it becomes 
a pressing issue. The framework here may help in coping with the political acceptability 
as it makes explicit how the burden is shared across generations. If such a policy line is 49 
not accepted, one important conclusion would be that the retirement age has to be 
increased significantly more than now projected for the EU average. 
The revised SGP now recognises the problem with the transitional cost of privatisation. 
However, the revised rules only allow a limited excess over the 3% of GDP deficit 
ceiling for a limited period of time. This was presumably motivated by the goal to 
preserve the SGP as a credible budgetary anchor. The downside of this naturally is, as 
our results show, that a partial privatisation on a fully actuarially neutral basis of a 
reformed and sound mono-pillar pension system may not easily be accommodated under 
the current rules. If, for example, one third of the implicit pension debt is swapped for 
explicit public debt, the government budget balance should be allowed to deteriorate by 4 
to 5 percentage points of GDP relative to the otherwise similar mono-pillar system. 
Therefore, the risk of breaching the 3% deficit ceiling becomes imminent. Hence, while 
there might be sound economic reasons for privatisation (e.g. a reduction in the 
distortionary effects of the pension system on the labour market), it is clear that under 
otherwise similar policies a country that maintains a mono-pillar system can be much 
more comfortable with the SGP rules than a country that contemplates and implements a 
partial privatisation of the system. This means that even though the fundamental 
principles of pension policies are in the sole competence of the EU Member States, major 
privatisation plans will (in most cases) have to be treated at the EU level. This is 
triggered by the rise in the deficit and the explicit public debt that has to be financed on 
the common financial market. Therefore, a balanced assessment of all relevant factors 
should probably take into account, for example, the country’s financial position (in 
particular, the debt level) before the reform. 
With regard to public pensions and the SGP there will always be the major question 
about the enforcement of the fiscal rules. Tension between economic rationale that 
obliges one to look at the highly uncertain long term with deficient data and the 
simplicity required by the political process will never disappear. Having put in place the 
short to medium term rules in the late 1990s, after the turn of the century the SGP was 
gradually extended to pay attention to long-run budgetary sustainability. The provisions 
in the EU Treaty and the revision of the SGP in 2005 provide the improved legal 
framework for policies to comply with the principle of sound public finances. However, 
it is generally acknowledged that improving the implementation of the legal rules is an 
ongoing process as the issues are complex and adequate data is often lacking. The 50 
framework in the present paper provides some clarification to the issues to be tackled, 
and the ongoing work of pension actuaries and statisticians to gather estimates on 
implicit pension liabilities for the national accounts will greatly help in analyzing the 
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No.191, 70-84. Appendix: a Model for Ageing-Related Public
Spending under PAYG versus Actuarial
Neutrality
1 Preliminaries
Table A1 describes the variables used in the model and its solution, while Table
A2 provides deﬁnitions and some relations that are useful for the sequel.
Table A1: Description of variables:
Symbol Description
wt unit gross wage (total wage cost)
wn
t wage net of pension contributions (= "net wage")
γt taxable income of the elderly as a share of wt
πt−1 accrual rate as a share of wt for pension to be paid out in period t
πn
t−1 accrual rate as a share of the net wage wn
t for pension to be paid out in period t
ct tax on gross wages and taxable gross income of elderly
c
p
t contribution rate to pensions as a share of gross wage
c
pn
t contribution rate to pensions as a share of net wage
˜ Lt new entrants into the labour force
Et number of newborns
Rt "eﬀective" number of elderly
lt years spent working in period t / years spent working in period 0
σt years spent in retirement in period t / years spent working in period t − 1
IPD implicit pension debt
GID gross implicit debt (present value of elderly related expenditure in the next period)
NID net implicit debt = GID minus the present value of taxes from the elderly
At consolidated net public sector assets
Qt assets held by the pension sector
Dt government debt
at consolidated net public sector assets as a share of the wage bill
qt pension sector assets as a share of the wage bill
dt government debt as a share of the wage bill
zt degree of funding of pension system
ρt gross interest rate / interest factor
µt interest mark-up on gross growth rate of wage bill
he,t public spending, e.g. health care, beneﬁting the elderly
ha,t public spending, e.g. health care, beneﬁting children and adults other than the elderly
θt implicit pension debt as share of the wage bill
1Table A2: Deﬁnitions and useful relations:
˜ Lt ≡ Et−1
Et ≡ ft˜ Lt
Lt ≡ lt˜ Lt








at = qt − dt
zt ≡ At/IPDt
IPDt = πtwt+1Rt+1/ρt+1
ρt ≡ (1 + µt)wtLt/(wt−1Lt−1)=( 1+µt)
wt(lt/lt−1)˜ Lt
wt−1 ˜ Lt−1
22 The general model
We assume that the economy is in a steady state up to and including period 0.
Hence, a0 = a−1 = ..., f0 = f−1 = ...and l0 = l−1 = ....
The consolidated (government and pension system) ﬂow budget constraint
is given by
ctwtLt + ctγtwtRt +( ρt − 1)At−1 = ha,twtLt + he,twtRt + At − At−1,














+ at − (1 + µt)at−1. (1)
2.1 Financing from current taxes
T h ee x p e n d i t u r e si nq u e s t i o nc a nb eﬁnances from current taxes. This would
correspond to a pure PAYG for public pensions. A simple case for debt policy
is to keep its GDP share constant. Therefore, total taxes should include a
component to cover the interest rate margin over the growth rate of the economy.
2.2 A policy rule aimed at equal treatment of generations
Assuming that the economy is in steady state in period 0,t h et a xr a t ei nt =0
is:
c0 =
ha,0 + he,0σ0/f0 − µ0a0
1+γ0σ0/f0
.
In some period t, there may be one of more shocks, such as a fall in fertility,
an increase in life expectancy (of the workers retired in that period). There
may also be a change in the number of years in working life. Furthermore,
the public expenditures beneﬁting the adults and elderly per person (ha,t and
he,t), and the projections thereof for the next period may change. Note that
these parameters may contain both policy induced elements and perceptions
as to how exogenous factors may aﬀect these expenditures per capita (medical
technology, etc.). Also, the interest rate mark-up µt+1 may change taking eﬀect
in the next period. For our numerical application we assume that these changes
do not depend on the other variables in the model.
We solve the general model under the rule that working generations that
are identical also have to pay the same contributions for the same beneﬁts.
This is done by technically assuming that, once they occur, the shocks persist.
Therefore, if a shock occurs in some period t,t h e nw es o l v et h em o d e la si ft h e r e
will be no further shocks in the subsequent periods. We indicate the solution
under this assumption with a superscript t, where relevant.
3Changes in the length of the working life may take place in response to
demographic and policy changes. These changes in the length of the working
life are assumed to take place in the period when the demographic and policy
changes happen or are known. Hence, lt
t = lt
t+1 = ...
Note that the way we solve the model in no way limits the generality of
the solution as new shocks may arrive later and a new solution is found in a
similar way. The solution is based on the known values of the variables for the
period in question and expectations on the values in the next period. We do
not address here any speciﬁc questions related to the accuracy of expectations.
In our setting any error in expectations becomes known in the next period, and
the consequences are shared between the then current and future generations
as the new decisions are based on the realised values and newly set expected
values for the subsequent periods.
We deﬁne,
Ht















































where, of course, l0
0 = l0 and σ0
0 = σ0.
























In the absence of further shocks, and assuming that unit beneﬁts and taxable
income of elderly are constant over time (ha,1 = ha,2 = ..., he,1 = he,2 = ... and
γ1 = γ2 = ...), the economy is in the new steady state as of period 2. Hence,
a2 = a3 = ..., σ1
2 = σ1
3 = ..., µ1
2 = µ1
3 = ..., H1
2 = H1
3 = ... and K1
2 = K1
3 = ....









The two expressions for c1
2 together imply:
H1















which implies that a1 = a2. Further, realising that working generations as of








































Substitute this back into the expression for c1

























































This thus provides the tax rate under the policy rule speciﬁed above.
2.3 Further calculations
Gross implicit debt in period t (based on the shocks in period t)a sas h a r eo f




























Net implicit debt in period t (based on the shocks in period t)a sas h a r eo ft h e





























3 Special case: the pension model
For pensions, we have:
γt =0 ,h a,t =0 ,h e,t = πt−1,I P D t = GIDt = NIDt. (3)
53.1 Pay-as-you-go
Under our PAYG system, taxes are set such that public debt (or public assets)
remains constant over time (i.e., at = at−1). That is, pension contributions are
set so as to cover current outlays, while additional taxes are raised to service








− µtat−1 = c
p
t − µtat−1. (4)
In this case, there is no need to indicate by superscripts the moment of the
shock.
3.1.1 Determination of the gross accrual rate for given net accrual
rate
To compute the appropriate value of πt−1,w eu s et h a tb o t h
wn

























































































































































































































which is the tax rate under the policy rule speciﬁed here. In the context of
the pension model this policy rule can be termed "actuarial neutrality" as each
generation of workers pays, ﬁrst, the interest mark-up on the sum of the implicit
pension liabilities and the explicit public debt stemming from the past decisions,
valued at the perceived interest mark-up for the future, and, secondly, pays the
full present value of their own future pensions. The latter establishes a direct
link between the future pensions and current contributions.
3.2.1 Total debt under actuarial neutrality



















which we can combine with the previous expression for c
a,t


































































We can see that for a constant µ actuarial neutrality implies a constant total
debt ratio. In the general case, where µt
t+1 6= µt
t, the total debt in the previous







should be treated as a capital gain. Obviously, the projected µt
t+1 should then
also be used in (8) for calculating the required tax rate. We can see directly
that an increase in µ, implying µt
t+1 >µ t
t, does not increase the ﬁrst component






< 1.A l s o ,µt
t+1 >µ t
t implies that




3.2.2 Determination of the gross accrual rate for given net accrual
rate
The policy instrument is πn
t−1, the accrual rate as a share of the net wage, and
we are left with the determination of πt−1.
First, we calculate the outcome that obtains as a result of the shocks in
period 1, assuming that there are no further shocks. Setting public debt dt to






























Here, a and p in the superscript for the contribution rate indicate that we are
considering actuarial neutrality and the contribution rate to pensions (rather
























Further, we have, by applying (1) and setting dt to zero, that the contribution








































































under the assumption that initial pension system assets are zero, q0 =0 .T h i s
is the new steady state pension contribution rate.
































































We now calculate the accrual rate as a share of the gross wage corresponding































































































































where q1 is given by (11) with q0 =0 .
































































94A ﬁxed interest rate













































































Plug the expression for µt provided by (14) into the expression for the tax rate





















































































































































w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h a tlt
t = lt
t+1.
Substitute the expression for 1+µt into (10) to give:
θ
t
























Note that the computation of the accrual rate as a share of the gross wage is
also aﬀected by the assumption of the constant interest rate. We simply need
to substitute (14) (and its appropriate leads and lags) into (12) and (13).
5 Correction factor for frequency conversion
The breakdown of ﬁgures from the frequency level of a period in our model (a
generation) to annual frequency requires the application of a correction factor.
Let τ index the year (where t indexes the period at generational frequency, i.e.
thirty years). Hence, Dt,τ is debt in year τ of period t and Yt,τ is output in year
τ of period t.W e d e ﬁne PRDt,τ as the primary deﬁcit in year τ of period t,
DEFt,τ as the deﬁcit in year τ of period t and rt,τ as the interest rate in year
τ of period t. Hence, ρt =
30 Y
τ=1
(1 + rt,τ).F u r t h e r ,dt,τ ≡ Dt,τ/Yt,τ is the debt -
GDP ratio in year τ of period t and deft,τ ≡ DEFt,τ/Yt,τ is the deﬁcit - GDP
ratio in year τ of period t. Debt dynamics is as follows:
Dt,30 =( 1 + rt,30)Dt,29 + PRDt,30
= Dt,29 +( rt,30Dt,29 + PRDt,30)



















































































































Observe that, with a constant debt - GDP ratio, d, this reduces to:
def =
µ
g
1+g
¶
d.
12